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ABSTRACT 
This Article argues that applying patent-like doctrine to design makes sense 
only for a design patent system premised on a patent-like conception of 
cumulative progress that permits patent examiners and courts to assess whether a 
novel design reflects a nonobvious step beyond the prior art. If there is a 
meaningful way to speak of such an inventive step in design, then design patent 
doctrine should be based on that conception. But if nonobviousness has no 
sensible meaning in design, then a patent system cannot work for design. At 
present, design patent doctrine is in disarray because it is unmoored from any 
conceptual underpinnings. Design patents are not needed to incentivize 
technological innovation, because that kind of innovation is the subject of utility 
patent law. Because aesthetic expression is not susceptible of an “inventive step” 
judgment, progress in aesthetic expression is not appropriately incentivized by a 
patent-like system. Indeed, copyright long has rejected the very possibility of 
incentivizing aesthetic progress with a “creative step” requirement because it 
has found no metric along which to measure aesthetic progress.  
If there is any type of cumulative progress to be sought in design it must 
therefore involve the interplay between aesthetics and utilitarian function. 
Aesthetics and utility intersect at the integration of form and function and that, we 
argue, is where design patents must be justified, if they can be justified at all. 
Once stated, this point is intuitively appealing. The integration of form and 
function is what distinguishes industrial design both from purely artistic 
expression (for which we have copyright) and from technological invention (for 
which we have utility patent). The converse also follows: if there is no workable 
means to assess the nonobviousness of a given design’s integration of form and 
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function, there can be no sensible design patent system. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Design patents are hot. Applicants are seeking design patents at record 
rates, and design patents are increasingly important parts of companies’ patent 
portfolios. Indeed, design patents are at the heart of the multibillion dollar 
“smartphone war” between Apple and Samsung. One reason for the growing 
importance of design patents is that, since about 1990, they appear to have 
become substantially easier to obtain than utility patents. About 10% of patents 
issued by the PTO since 1990 have been design patents.1 Until recently, 
however, design patents have received little scholarly attention. As a result, a 
number of basic theoretical questions remain unanswered. Indeed, in our view, 
no persuasive first-principles justification for design patents has been offered.   
In this Article, we begin to address the most foundational theoretical 
 
 1.  Prior to 1990, the ratio of design patents issued to design patent applications each 
year roughly tracked the ratio for utility patents. In 1990, however, the ratio of issued design 
patents to applications jumped from 50% to 70% and averaged 77% between 1990 and 2012. 
During the same period, the ratio for utility patents declined from about 60% to about 45%. 
Consequently, the ratio of design patents issued to utility patents issued, which had hovered 
near 6% since around 1960, jumped to about 10%, peaking at 16% in 2008. Over the period 
from 1990 to 2013, approximately 10% of all issued patents were design patents. See Patent 
Statistics, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. (Apr. 4, 2015, 5:19 PM), http://www.uspto.gov/ 
patents/stats/index.jsp (providing data on which these calculations are based). 
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question: What are design patents for? Or, to be a bit more precise, when, if 
ever, do patents make sense as incentives for “progress” in industrial design? 
This is a vexing question because, while the Constitution tells us that patents 
are intended to promote progress, the design patent system lacks a coherent 
stated, or even implicit, conception of “progress.” Without such a conception, 
and some sense of how it relates to the “progress” promoted by the copyright 
and utility patent systems, it is difficult to determine the need for, or evaluate 
the benefits of, design patent protection.   
We argue that a cumulative notion of progress is deeply embedded in the 
patent system, especially in the requirement of nonobviousness or “inventive 
step.” Moreover, patent doctrine assumes that competition plays a dynamic role 
in producing a baseline of innovation in addition to its static role of reducing 
prices and increasing quality. Because of the cumulative nature of 
technological progress, exclusive rights over obvious improvements create both 
dynamic and static harms.  
The copyright system’s focus on copying and its low “originality” 
threshold for coverage reflect different underlying premises about how best to 
incentivize “progress” in aesthetic expression.2 Copyright law makes no 
attempt to assess the size or value of the “creative step” taken by an expressive 
work. Moreover, copyright doctrine for the most part discourages, rather than 
encourages, expression that builds on particular previous works. Where 
copyright doctrine accommodates the need to incorporate aspects of earlier 
creative work, it focuses on relatively general concepts. Overall, copyright 
doctrine displays much less concern for the effects of more granular exclusivity 
on dynamic progress. Instead, copyright doctrine promotes a conception of 
progress based on quantity and variety of independently created works.3  
Applying patent-like doctrine to design makes sense only if a design patent 
system is premised on a patent-like conception of cumulative progress that 
permits patent examiners and courts to assess whether a novel design reflects a 
step of some magnitude beyond the prior art. If there is a meaningful way to 
speak of an inventive step in design, then design patent doctrine should be 
 
 2.  There are at least three ways one might look at this observation as a normative 
matter. Perhaps there is no meaningful conception of “progress” in aesthetic expression, or at 
least there are no judicially manageable standards for assessing such progress. Alternatively, 
it might be that aesthetic progress exists but that its path is so unpredictable and long term 
that it is too difficult to evaluate whether one work takes a bigger “creative step” than 
another until long after the fact. Finally, it might be that copyright doctrine is simply 
mistaken in this regard and society would benefit from some kind of “creative step” 
requirement. For the most part, we assume in this discussion that one of the first two 
perspectives is correct, though we comment briefly on how the analysis here might 
contribute to the normative debate about copyright doctrine. 
 3.  This is not to say that we are convinced that it is possible to design a copyright 
system that maximizes quantity and variety overall, as opposed to maximizing the quantity 
of particular kinds of works. 
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based on that conception. If nonobviousness has no sensible meaning in design, 
however, then a patent system makes no sense for design. At present,  design 
patent doctrine is in disarray because it is unmoored from any conceptual 
underpinnings. It goes astray primarily for two reasons. First, design patent law 
lacks a coherent mechanism for limiting the scope of its subject matter. While 
courts attempt to distinguish design patent from utility patent by interpreting 
the ornamentality requirement to rule out “functional” designs, this distinction 
has never proven to be a stable one. Second, design patent law errs by 
attempting to impose a nonobviousness requirement on primarily aesthetic 
expression. The copyright system long has rejected the very possibility of 
incentivizing aesthetic progress with such a “creative step” requirement 
because it has found no metric along which to measure aesthetic progress. It is 
no wonder that the design patent system’s attempt to impose such a 
requirement has been an utter failure.  
Our earlier question thus can be rephrased this way: Is there a form of 
“inventive step” that a patent system might incentivize with respect to design? 
Design patents are not needed to incentivize technological invention, because 
that kind of innovation is the subject of utility patent law. And because 
aesthetic expression is not susceptible of the same sort of “inventive step” 
judgment, progress in aesthetic expression is not appropriately incentivized by 
a patent-like system. If there is any type of cumulative progress to be sought in 
design it must therefore involve the intersection between aesthetics and 
utilitarian function. Aesthetics and utility intersect at the integration of form 
and function, and that, we argue, is where design patents must be justified, if 
they can be justified at all. Once stated, this point is intuitively appealing. The 
integration of form and function is what distinguishes industrial design from 
both purely artistic expression (for which we have copyright) and technological 
invention (for which we have utility patent). Consequently, design patents 
could fill a niche in the intellectual property system if progress in design can be 
assessed in integrationist terms. The converse also follows: If there is no 
workable means to assess the nonobviousness of a given design’s integration of 
form and function, there can be no sensible design patent system.  
Before we dive in, an important caveat is in order. Our suggestion that a 
design patent system might sensibly focus on incentivizing nonobvious steps in 
integrating form and function is preliminary. We take no position at this point 
as to whether it is feasible to ground a nonobviousness inquiry on the 
integration of form and function, or as to whether design patents are necessary 
to incentivize progress in the integration of form and function. We thus take no 
position as yet on the ultimate question of whether there should be a design 
patent system at all. We do, however, argue that under current law and doctrine 
the design patent system is doomed to fail. And we further argue that only by 
focusing on the unique role design patent law could play can we actually 
address the question of whether such a system is needed. One cannot ask 
whether design patents are needed without asking what they would be needed 
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for. As things currently stand, there is no coherent answer to that question.  
Part I of this Article describes how particular conceptions of progress and 
competition are embedded in the doctrines of patent, copyright, and trademark 
law. Part II explores how those conceptions relate to the functionality doctrines 
that apply at the intersections of these systems and discusses how they inform 
the subject matter of design patent. Part III critiques the design patent system in 
light of the conceptions of progress and competition reflected in other forms of 
IP law, focusing especially on the design patent doctrine of nonobviousness. It 
argues that, as a historical matter, the design patent doctrine’s lack of a 
coherent conception of cumulative progress has put it on a treadmill in which 
utilitarian aspects of design are repeatedly thrown out of the system only to re-
enter through the back door. Part IV argues that the integration of form and 
function must be the focus of any theoretically coherent design patent system 
and discusses some of the potential implications of such a focus.  
I. PROGRESS AND COMPETITION IN IP DOCTRINE  
In this Part, we analyze the conceptions of progress and competition 
reflected in patent, copyright, and trademark law. Specifically, we argue that 
patent law embeds a cumulative conception of technological progress, which is 
accompanied by a dynamic conception of competition. Copyright doctrine is 
not focused on cumulative progress. Instead, it reflects an approach to progress 
perhaps best described as “let a thousand flowers bloom.” In line with this 
conception, copyright seeks to ensure that potential creators have access to a 
palette of high level aesthetic elements, but it limits access to specific elements 
of prior expressive works. Trademark law is concerned primarily with 
facilitating static competition by ensuring that consumers are not misled about 
the products and services they purchase. Importantly, however, we argue that 
trademark law subordinates its static competition goals to the patent and 
copyright systems’ judgments about how to encourage inventive and creative 
progress and promote dynamic competition. 
A. Progress and Competition in Patent Doctrine  
Utility patent doctrine is shot through with the assumption that 
technological progress is cumulative. Patent opinions repeatedly refer to the 
patent system’s promotion of “improvements,” “advances,” “progress,” and the 
solution of “problems.”4 Because of this conception of progress, patent doctrine 
 
 4.  See, e.g., KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417, 419-20 (2007) (“[A] 
court must ask whether the improvement is more than the predictable use of prior art 
elements . . . . Granting patent protection to advances that would occur in the ordinary course 
without real innovation retards progress . . . . One of the ways in which a patent’s subject 
 
001--MCKENNA & STRANDBURG_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/27/2014 9:55 AM 
6 STANFORD TECHNOLOGY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:1 
is parsimonious, in that it is always cognizant of the need to balance incentives 
between generations of inventors. While commentators and courts may 
disagree strongly about what patentability standards would achieve the most 
appropriate balance, there is widespread agreement that balance is necessary. A 
few doctrinal examples will make the point. 
Patent law’s disclosure requirement, implemented by the written 
description and enablement doctrines, seeks to ensure that potential inventors 
can learn from the previous work of others. But patent law does not reward 
mere reinvention of the wheel. Not only are duplicative patents denied even to 
independent inventors, but those independent inventors may be sued for 
infringing others’ patents that cover their inventions.5  
The cumulative notion of progress underlying the patent system is most 
evident in the novelty and nonobviousness requirements. Because patentability 
is judged with reference to prior art, inventors are encouraged to acquaint 
themselves with pre-existing technology and to “design around” or build upon 
it.6 The nonobviousness requirement (evocatively called “inventive step” in 
most other jurisdictions7) adds a quantitative dimension to the patentability 
determination. To be patentable, an invention must not only be different from 
 
matter can be proved obvious is by noting that there existed at the time of invention a known 
problem for which there was an obvious solution . . . .”). A LexisAdvance search of Federal 
Circuit patent cases, for example, uncovered 725 opinions referring to “improvements,” 
1,227 opinions referring to “advances,” 238 opinions referring to “progress,” and 579 
opinions referring to “problems” in the same sentence as “solve” or “solution.” LexisNexis 
Grp., LEXISADVANCE, https://advance.lexis.com/GoToExperienceBarPageResearch (last 
visited Dec. 29, 2013) (log-in; then search for “improvements”; then filter by “Cases-Court: 
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals” and “Practice Areas & Topics: Patent Law”; then repeat 
the process for the search terms “advances,” “progress,” and “problems w/sent (solve or 
solution)”). 
 5.  Patent law thus expects potential follow-on inventors to search patent disclosures 
before investing. The reasonableness of that expectation has been challenged, especially in 
the information technology arena, and commentators have suggested various 
accommodations for independent inventors who are not copyists. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, 
Should Patent Infringement Require Proof of Copying?, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1525 (2007); 
Katherine J. Strandburg, Patent Fair Use 2.0, 1 UC IRVINE L. REV. 265 (2011); Samson 
Vermont, Independent Invention as a Defense to Patent Infringement, 105 MICH. L. REV. 
475 (2006). The 2011 American Invents Act included a very minimal prior user defense. See 
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-29, sec. 5, § 273, 125 Stat. 284, 
297-99 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 273 (2011)). 
 6.  This is, of course, not necessarily to suggest that inventors do familiarize 
themselves with prior art. In some cases the burden of doing so may seem insurmountable. 
See Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 19. 
 7.  See, e.g., Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
art. 27, § 1, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1197, 1208, available at http://www.wto.org 
/english/tratop_e/trips_e/t_agm0_e.htm (“[P]atents shall be available for any inventions, 
whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they . . . involve an 
inventive step . . . .”).  
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what has been done before, it must be “different enough.”8  
Patent law’s comfort with assessing the “size” of technological advances 
no doubt stems not only from a recognition of the importance of cumulative 
invention, but also from the fact that it is reasonably feasible. We often can 
agree on how to assess technical improvement—the computer runs faster, has 
more memory, is cheaper or more durable, etc. Patent doctrine has backed 
away from requiring that a patentable invention be “better” than what came 
before, largely rejecting the notion that patent examiners and courts can, as a 
practical matter, accurately assess the potential commercial or social benefits of 
particular inventions.9 However, the focus on technological advance does not 
reflect a retreat from patent law’s cumulative conception of progress. Even if 
we do not think it is possible at the time of patenting to evaluate the amount 
that a particular step contributes to the public good over the long term, it is 
sensible to believe that denying patents to technologically obvious changes is 
likely to result in greater progress.10 That belief continues to permeate both 
doctrine and rhetoric.  
The notion of cumulative progress turns patents into double-edged swords, 
leading to doctrinal obsession with balancing the needs of current and future 
inventors. If progress is cumulative, it will not be enough for follow-on 
inventors to learn from and then “design around” earlier inventions. In many 
cases, they will need to incorporate aspects of earlier inventions into their own 
inventive output. Thus, inventors may patent “improvements” that incorporate 
earlier patented inventions11 without any authorization from earlier patentees.12 
 
8.   See KSR, 550 U.S. at 427 (holding the claimed adjustable gas pedal with electronic 
sensor obvious in light of prior art adjustable gas pedals and prior art electronic sensors 
because the combination was “well within the grasp of a person of ordinary skill in the 
relevant art”). 
 9.  Courts have made this clear in modern utility cases, in contrast to earlier cases in 
which courts would deny patentability because the claimed invention was no better than the 
prior art. See, e.g., Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 528-36 (1966) (finding a patent was 
rightfully denied on utility grounds). 
 10.  That we see technical progress over time does not tell us, of course, that such 
progress can be attributed to patent law particularly, since we cannot know how much 
improvement we would have seen without the availability of patent law. 
 11.  35 U.S.C. § 101 (2011) (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful 
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful 
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and 
requirements of this title.” (emphasis added)); see also 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON 
PATENTS, § 1-GLOS (Matthew Bender, 2011) (“An inventor may patent an improvement on 
an existing product or process []whether or not it is patented . . . . An invention claimed in 
one patent may require for its practice use of another invention claimed in another patent. In 
such a case of blocking patents, common subject matter may be used only with the 
concurrent authority of both patent owners.”). 
 12.  In this situation, the later inventor may not be able to use her invention without 
incurring liability, but neither can the earlier inventor use the improvement without 
infringing the later inventor’s patent. 
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The assumption is that such “blocking patents” will lead to socially beneficial 
licensing agreements.13 Blocking patents impose costs on downstream 
inventors, however, and patent doctrine attempts to lower the costs for follow-
on inventors in various ways. For example, utility patents have a relatively 
short twenty-year-from-application term14 and expire earlier if maintenance 
fees are not paid.15 
Most importantly, patent doctrine protects follow-on inventors by seeking 
to award patents only when they are needed. This goal underlies the 
nonobviousness requirement. The denial of patents for insufficient advances 
reflects an assumption that “ordinary innovation” will occur without the need 
for a patent incentive—competition (and other motivations) will produce a 
dynamic baseline level of technological progress without any need for 
exclusive rights. The nonobviousness doctrine thus seeks to reserve patents 
only for those inventions that reflect “ingenuity and skill” beyond that of the 
“ordinary mechanic.”16 As the Supreme Court explained in KSR v. Teleflex, its 
most recent opinion on nonobviousness:  
 We build and create by bringing to the tangible and palpable reality around 
us new works based on instinct, simple logic, ordinary inferences, 
extraordinary ideas, and sometimes even genius. These advances, once part of 
our shared knowledge, define a new threshold from which innovation starts 
once more. And as progress beginning from higher levels of achievement is 
expected in the normal course, the results of ordinary innovation are not the 
subject of exclusive rights under the patent laws. Were it otherwise patents 
might stifle, rather than promote, the progress of useful arts.17  
Because cumulative innovation depends as much on the availability of 
unpatented technology for use by inventors as it does on protection for 
nonobvious advances, patent doctrine seeks to ensure untrammeled access to 
obvious and otherwise unpatentable advances. Thus, for example, patents may 
 
 13.  See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining 
Breakdown: The Case of Blocking Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV. 75 (1994); Robert P. Merges & 
Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 
860-61 (1990). There are various problems with the assumptions underlying the blocking 
patents approach, as discussed by one of us in earlier work, see Strandburg, supra note 5, but 
the point for present purposes is that this doctrine reflects a theory of progress as cumulative 
advance. 
 14.  35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (patents expire twenty years after date the application was 
filed). 
 15.  35 U.S.C. § 41(b)(2) (“Unless payment of the applicable maintenance fee under 
paragraph (1) is received in the Office on or before the date the fee is due or within a grace 
period of 6 months thereafter, the patent shall expire as of the end of such grace period.”) 
 16.  Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248, 267 (1850); see also Michael 
Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, The Inducement Standard of Patentability, 120 YALE L.J. 
1590 (2011) (arguing that the nonobviousness requirement should be interpreted such that 
only inventions for which a patent was necessary to induce the invention are patentable). 
 17.  KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 427 (2007). 
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be challenged by litigants and invalidated years after they were issued.18  
Moreover, states are preempted from offering patent-like protection to 
inventions that are unpatentable under federal law.19   
These are just a few examples of patent law’s concern with the balance 
between generations of inventors, which runs throughout the doctrine.20 
Indeed, surprisingly few patent doctrines focus on static competition. We 
assume that, because patents are relatively short in duration, products 
embodying inventions will eventually become available at competitive prices. 
Given the pace and cumulative nature of technological change, however, the 
expiration of one patent often leaves users not with access to unpatented 
products, but with access to new and improved patented products. Drugs are 
obviously a potential exception here,21 though pharmaceutical companies do 
their best to market patented “improvements.”22 Likewise, patent law pays very 
little attention to users. The relatively few and weak exemptions that might 
benefit users are aimed at promoting follow-on invention,23 and compulsory 
licensing is strongly disfavored.24 Subject matter doctrines precluding the 
 
 18.  See, e.g., United States v. Glaxo Grp. Ltd., 410 U.S. 52, 69 (1973) (“[T]here is a 
public interest favoring the judicial testing of patent validity and the invalidation of specious 
patents.”); Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969) (noting “public interest” in 
invalidating patents so as to permit “full and free competition in the use of ideas which are in 
reality a part of the public domain”) 
 19.  See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 152 (1989). 
States may, however, offer trade secret protection to undisclosed inventions that might be 
patentable subject matter. Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257 (1979). The 
legitimacy of that protection is directly related to the undisclosed nature of the invention, 
however. 
 20.  This is an observation, rather than a normative endorsement, of course. 
 21.  See, e.g., Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, TRIPS and Essential Medicines: Must One Size 
Fit All? Making the WTO Responsive to the Global Health Crisis, in INCENTIVES FOR 
GLOBAL PUBLIC HEALTH: PATENT LAW AND ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL MEDICINES (Thomas 
Pogge, Matthew Rimmer & Kim Rubenstein eds., 2010); Smita Narula, The Rights-Based 
Approach to Intellectual Property and Access to Medicine: Parameters and Pitfalls, in 
BALANCING WEALTH AND HEALTH: GLOBAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND THE BATTLE OVER 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES IN LATIN AMERICA (Rochelle Dreyfuss 
& César Rodríguez Garavito, eds., forthcoming March 2014), manuscript available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1923299. 
 22.  See, e.g., WORLD HEALTH ORG., WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG. & WORLD 
TRADE ORG., PROMOTING ACCESS TO MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES AND INNOVATION: 
INTERSECTIONS BETWEEN PUBLIC HEALTH, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND TRADE 131 (2012), 
available at http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/freepublications/en/global_challenges 
/628/wipo_pub_628.pdf. 
 23.  See 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2011) (exempting medical and surgical procedures from 
liability); Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362  (Fed. Cir. 2002) (limiting the 
experimental use defense to cases in which the defendant’s use is for purely philosophical 
inquiry). 
 24.  The Supreme Court’s decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 
(2006) altered the balance here to some extent since it reinforced that injunctions would not 
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patenting of abstract ideas, natural phenomena, and products of nature also 
seem to aim primarily at facilitating downstream invention,25 though they may 
play some role in facilitating static competition by assuring that certain “basic 
tools” are available to all market participants.26   
B. Progress and Competition in Copyright Law 
Copyright law, despite having the same constitutional mandate to promote 
“progress,” takes a very different approach. Basic copyright doctrine does not 
incentivize authors to be aware of others’ work or to strive to design around or 
build upon it. To the contrary, since copyrights are infringed only by copying 
(and not by independent creation), the doctrine may even incentivize authors to 
avoid awareness of others’ work.27 Certainly, copyright law rewards 
independent creation. Whereas patent law allows, and perhaps even 
encourages, inventors to build upon others’ work by awarding “blocking 
patents” on improvements, copyright currently incorporates an exclusive right 
to make “derivative works” that actively discourages authors from building on 
others’ previous works. Under § 103(a), “protection for a work employing 
preexisting material in which copyright subsists does not extend to any part of 
the work in which such material has been used unlawfully.”28 Thus, rather than 
award a “blocking copyright,” the Copyright Act denies protection to 
unauthorized derivative works even when those works add considerable 
originality.29 Copyright’s long (and growing) term of protection similarly 
 
automatically issue in patent cases. See id. at 393-94. 
 25.  See Katherine J. Strandburg, Much Ado About Preemption, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 563 
(2013) (discussing and critiquing the Supreme Court’s patentable subject matter doctrine and 
its relationship to downstream innovation); Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & James P. Evans, From 
Bilski Back to Benson: Preemption, Inventing Around, and the Case of Genetic Diagnostics, 
63 STAN. L. REV. 1349 (2011) (same); Mark A. Lemley et al., Life After Bilski, 63 STAN. L. 
REV. 1315 (2011); see also Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. 
2107, 2116 (2013) (“Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not 
patentable. . . . As the Court has explained, without this exception, there would be 
considerable danger that the grant of patents would tie up the use of such tools and thereby 
inhibit future innovation premised upon them.”). 
 26.  See, e.g., Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3255 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“Business methods 
are . . . the basic tools of commercial work.” (emphasis omitted)); Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Are 
Business Method Patents Bad for Business?, 16 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 
263, 276-77 (2000) (arguing that patents on business methods disrupt the competitive 
market). 
 27.  Many have suggested that this is precisely what happens in the software industry, 
where companies put their developers in “clean” rooms and hope they will not become 
aware of other code. See, e.g., Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Strict Liability and Its 
Alternatives in Patent Law, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 799, 814-15 (2002). 
 28.  17 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2011). 
 29.  See, e.g., Bucklew v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co., LLP., 329 F.3d 923, 930 (7th 
Cir. 2003) (finding infringement because “[v]ariants that result from tinkering with a copied 
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suggests a relative lack of concern that later creators might need to incorporate 
earlier expression into their work.30  
Nor does copyright doctrine contain anything analogous to patent law’s 
nonobviousness requirement. The threshold for copyrightability is 
“originality,” which the Supreme Court has interpreted to mean only that “the 
work was independently created by the author (as opposed to copied from other 
works), and that it possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity.”31 
These are not difficult requirements to meet. According to the Court, “the 
requisite level of creativity is extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice. 
The vast majority of works make the grade quite easily, as they possess some 
creative spark, ‘no matter how crude, humble or obvious’ it might be.”32 To put 
it plainly, originality does not entail difference. “Originality does not signify 
novelty; a work may be original even though it closely resembles other works 
so long as the similarity is fortuitous, not the result of copying.”33  
These pervasive differences between patent and copyright doctrine reflect 
fundamentally different intuitions about the ways in which expressive and 
inventive creativity function and how they benefit society. As Barton Beebe has 
persuasively argued, we have never had a good metric for evaluating progress 
of the fine arts.34 Copyright doctrine thus appears designed to encourage a 
profusion of independent works, rather than works that incorporate and build 
upon the work of previous authors. Perhaps the implicit theory is that 
promoting the independent expressions of a large, diverse group of creators will 
benefit society by appealing to a wide variety of aesthetic sensibilities.35 Or 
 
form are derivative works from that form, and it is a copyright infringement to make or sell a 
derivative work without a license from the owner of the copyright on the work from which 
the derivative work is derived”); Anderson v. Stallone, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (C.D. 
Cal. 1989) (finding Anderson’s “treatment” for Rocky IV not to be copyrightable because it 
was an unauthorized derivative of the Rocky characters). 
 30.  Copyright for any work created after January 1, 1978 endures for the life of the 
author plus 70 years. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a). Copyright in works made for hire endure for the 
shorter of 95 years from the date of publication or 120 years from the date or creation. 
§ 302(c). 
 31.  Feist Pub’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991). 
 32.  Id. (quoting 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 
§ 1.08[C][1] (1990)). 
 33.  Id. at 345-46 (“To illustrate, assume that two poets, each ignorant of the other, 
compose identical poems. Neither work is novel, yet both are original and, hence, 
copyrightable.”). 
 34.  Barton Beebe, Bleistein, Copyright Law, and the Problem of Aesthetic Progress 
13-14 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors). 
 35.  There is, of course, a major debate about whether the current contours of copyright 
are appropriate to its purpose, whether its current scope of protection is necessary to produce 
a socially beneficial profusion of creative expression, and the extent to which later creative 
expression should be permitted to appropriate and build upon earlier expression. We mention 
those debates here for the most part only in passing and certainly do not intend to take a 
position on them in this Article. Our point is simply that the two doctrinal channels reflect 
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perhaps the underlying notion is that the most valuable expression is created by 
a “romantic author” whose work is guided not by reference to the work of 
others, but by attending to an internal muse. Whatever the reason, copyright 
law seems to have settled on a quantitative, rather than a qualitative, conception 
of progress.   
Equally importantly, courts have concluded that is impossible to measure 
the extent to which a particular combination of previous expression has 
advanced over the prior works. As the Supreme Court stated more than one 
hundred years ago, in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.: 
 It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to 
constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, 
outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits. At the one extreme some 
works of genius would be sure to miss appreciation. Their very novelty would 
make them repulsive until the public had learned the new language in which 
their author spoke. It may be more than doubted, for instance, whether the 
etchings of Goya or the paintings of Manet would have been sure of protection 
when seen for the first time. At the other end, copyright would be denied to 
pictures which appealed to a public less educated than the judge. Yet if they 
command the interest of any public, they have a commercial value—it would 
be bold to say that they have not an aesthetic and educational value—and the 
taste of any public is not to be treated with contempt.36  
Consistent with its interest in promoting quantity and variety, copyright 
law is unforgiving (particularly as compared with patent law) regarding 
incorporation of prior work. Specifically, copyright doctrine permits creators to 
use high level aesthetic conceptions from previous works, primarily through the 
idea-expression doctrine and related concepts of merger and scènes à faire.37 
But these doctrines do not allow use of more particular expression, exempting 
only stock characters, plot types, and relatively high-level ideas from copyright 
protection.38  
 
very different theories of “progress.” 
 36.  188 U.S. 239, 251-52 (1903). 
 37.  See, e.g., Bucklew v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co., LLP, 329 F.3d 923, 929-30 
(7th Cir. 2003) (“[A] copyright owner can’t prove infringement by pointing to features of his 
work that are found in the defendant’s work as well but that are so rudimentary, 
commonplace, standard, or unavoidable that they do not serve to distinguish one work within 
a class of works from another.”); Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d 
Cir. 1930) (Upon any work . . . a great number of patterns of increasing generality will fit 
equally well, as more and more of the incident is left out. . . . [T]here is a point in this series 
of abstractions where they are no longer protected, since otherwise the playwright could 
prevent the use of his “ideas,” to which, apart from their expression, his property is never 
extended.”). 
 38.  A second thread of idea-expression doctrine distinguishes copyrightable 
expression from uncopyrightable facts and methods. See, e.g., Feist Pub’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. 
Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340 (1991); Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 516 U.S. 233 
(1996) (per curiam) (mem), aff’g 49 F.3d 807, 815 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding that a computer 
menu command hierarchy is an uncopyrightable “method of operation”); Baker v. Selden, 
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Copyright’s fair use doctrine also reflects this conception of progress as 
profusion. The statute sets out four factors to be considered in determining 
whether a use is fair:  
 (1) The purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of 
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
 (2) The nature of the copyrighted work; 
 (3) The amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and 
 (4) The effect of the use upon the potential market for, or value of, the 
copyrighted work.39 
For the most part, these factors focus on whether the use in question 
disrupts the copyright holder’s present market for the existing work, rather than 
on the value of building on that existing work. Indeed, the Supreme Court has 
stated that effect upon the original author’s potential market is “the single most 
important element of fair use.”40  
One potential exception to this static focus is “transformative use.” While 
the copyright statute defines an infringing derivative work as one which 
“recast[s], transform[s], or adapt[s]” preexisting works,41 courts have recently 
interpreted the first statutory fair use factor to favor “transformative uses” of 
preexisting works.42 For the most part, “transformative use”-based fair use has 
not aimed to promote “progress” by the incorporation of previous works. While 
transformativeness is sometimes used to protect free speech interests, courts’ 
analyses in these cases tend to turn on the extent to which the defendant’s use 
“usurps” the (static) market for the original work. Thus, uses that critique, 
parody, or otherwise “comment on” an existing work generally are deemed 
“fair” because courts assume that those uses do not substitute for the original, 
even if they might affect demand for it.43 In other cases, courts have used 
 
101 U.S. 99, 100-01 (1879) (“Where the truths of a science or the methods of an art are the 
common property of the whole world, an author has the right to express the one, or explain 
and use the other, in his own way.”). This thread is related to the boundary between the 
coverage of patent and copyright. See, e.g., Baker, 101 U.S. at 102-03. 
 39.  17 U.S.C. § 107 (2011). 
 40.  Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985). The 
Court has since tried to soften that statement, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 
569, 591 (1994), but the effect on the market continues to dominate in most cases. See 
Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978-2005, 156 U. 
PA. L. REV. 549, 587 (2008) (“It is certainly interesting to observe, now based on empirical 
evidence, that the outcome of the fourth factor appears to drive the outcome of the test, and 
that the outcome of the first factor also appears to be highly influential.”). 
 41.  17 U.S.C. § 101 (2011). 
 42.  See, e.g., Beebe, supra note 40, at 404-06. 
 43.  See, e.g., Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579-81; Brownmark Films, LLC v. Comedy 
Partners, 682 F.3d 687, 693-94 (7th Cir. 2012); Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 
F.3d 1257, 1268-69 (11th Cir. 2001). To the extent courts’ conclusions that parodies do not 
substitute for the original are meant to be empirical rather than normative, it is not clear they 
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“transformativeness” to preclude liability for uses that seem far removed from 
incentives to create new expressive works, such as the use of thumbnail images 
in search results.44   
Several recent cases involving “appropriation art” are particularly 
instructive regarding copyright’s conception of progress. These cases are 
interesting because, while copyright generally assumes that a profusion of new 
works is possible as long as relatively high-level concepts are available to new 
creators, appropriation art is defined by its reuse of earlier works.45 In some of 
these cases, courts have used “transformative use” as a hook for finding a fair 
use right to reuse specific pieces of prior expressive works. But even in these 
cases we can see stark differences between copyright and patent, since courts in 
these cases focus on transformation and difference rather than on improvement 
and advance.   
Blanch v. Koons, for example, involved a piece entitled “Niagara” by Jeff 
Koons, a “visual artist” whose “work has been exhibited widely in museums 
and commercial galleries.”46 Koons based Niagara on a collage of images, one 
of which was from a photograph used in an advertisement for Gucci sandals. In 
finding fair use, the court noted that the doctrine “mediates” between “the 
property rights [copyright law] establishes in creative works, which must be 
protected up to a point, and the ability of authors, artists, and the rest of us to 
express them—or ourselves by reference to the works of others . . . .”47 
Specifically regarding the transformativeness of Koons’s use, the court 
concluded that Koons had a “genuine creative rationale for borrowing Blanch’s 
image.”48 Koons and Blanch (the owner of the copyright in the photograph) 
had “sharply different objectives” in creating their works, with Koons using 
Blanch’s photograph as “fodder for his commentary on the social and aesthetic 
consequences of mass media” rather than merely “repackag[ing]” it.49 The 
court described the transformation from “a fashion photograph created for 
publication in a glossy American ‘lifestyles’ magazine” into “part of a massive 
painting commissioned for exhibition in a German art-gallery space.”50  
 
are necessarily correct. See Bruce P. Keller & Rebecca Tushnet, Even More Parodic than the 
Real Thing: Parody Lawsuits Revisited, 94 Trademark Rep. 979, 995-96 (2004) (noting that 
the claim that owners would not license parodies is demonstrably false in at least some 
cases). Thus, transformativeness is likely serving interests other than market preemption, 
even if not entirely transparently. 
 44.  Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1164-68 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 45.  Appropriation art is not alone in this respect. Entire categories of music are based 
on combining digital samples of earlier works. See generally PETER DICOLA, CREATIVE 
LICENSE: THE LAW AND CULTURE OF DIGITAL SAMPLING (2011). 
 46.  467 F.3d 244, 246 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 47.  Id. at 250. 
 48.  Id. at 255. 
 49.  Id. at 253. 
 50.  Id. 
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Similarly, in Cariou v. Prince,51 the Second Circuit granted summary 
judgment of fair use with respect to 25 pieces of appropriation art that were 
based on photographs. The court opined that the defendant’s artwork was 
transformative because it “manifest[ed] an entirely different aesthetic” than the 
original photographs.52 While the original photographs were “serene and 
deliberately composed,” the appropriation works were “crude and jarring,” 
“hectic and provocative.”53   
And finally, in Morris v. Guetta,54 the court summarized the fair use 
standard for appropriation art in this way: “[a]n artist is not required to 
compromise his or her artistic vision merely because the artist could have made 
a similar statement in a non-infringing way. However, the artist must provide a 
sufficient justification for using another’s copyrighted material in effecting the 
artist’s vision.”55 In Morris, however, the court’s “independent review” 
concluded that Guetta’s appropriation art, which was based on Morris’s 
photographs of Sid Vicious of the Sex Pistols, was not sufficiently 
transformative.56 According to the court, Vicious was “making a distinct facial 
expression” in Morris’s photo, and Guetta’s works showed the same 
expression.57 Though Guetta had added “certain new elements,” his works 
“remain[ed] at their core pictures of Sid Vicious,” which did not convey 
“sufficient new meaning” to be transformative.58 The “new elements” Guetta 
introduced included “higher black and white contrast,” “less subtle detail,” 
“splashes of brightly colored paint,” “sunglasses,” “a backdrop with the 
character Snoopy and palm trees,” a “mole on the image of the face . . . and an 
overlay of blonde hair in a different style,” and being “made out of broken 
vinyl records.”59 
These cases are of interest to us here for two reasons. First, they nicely 
illustrate Bleistein’s concern that it is a “dangerous undertaking for persons 
trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth” of 
aesthetic expression.60 Indeed, these decisions suggest that the courts may well 
have fallen prey to exactly the kind of bias against popular taste that concerned 
 
 51.  714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 52.  Id. at 709. 
 53.  Id. at 706. The court remanded for the district court to assess whether the 
“relatively minimal alterations” to five additional photographs were sufficiently 
transformative. Id. at 711. 
 54.  No. LA CV12-00684 JAK (RZx), 2013 U.S. Dist. Lexis 15556 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 
2013). 
 55.  Id. at *26. 
 56.  Id. at *27-28. 
 57.  Id. at *28. 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  Id. at *3-4. 
 60.  Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903). 
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the Court in Bleistein, since “appropriation art” is often, though not always, 
deemed fair use,61 while even minimal digital sampling (mostly for hip-hop 
music) generally is not excused.62  
Second, these cases illustrate the continued difference between patent law’s 
cumulative conception of progress and copyright’s focus on quantity and 
variety. Even when courts allow reuse of specific pieces of prior expression, 
they do so because they focus on transformation and difference rather than on 
improvement and advance. Patent law’s nonobviousness inquiry, which focuses 
on whether the combination of prior elements would have emerged even in the 
absence of intellectual property protection, simply has no purchase in this 
context. 
Thus, despite the recent appropriation art cases, we think that as a matter 
either of principle or of practicality, the copyright system will continue for the 
foreseeable future to be imbued with a conception of progress as quantity and 
diversity.  
C. Trademark and Competition 
Unlike patent and copyright, trademark law does not focus on creativity or 
innovation but instead on improving static competition by preventing certain 
misleading uses of a trademark that might interfere with consumers’ purchasing 
decisions.63  There are tradeoffs in trademark law’s pursuit of this goal. When 
one producer is awarded exclusive rights to particular marks, others are 
necessarily deprived of the use of those words, symbols, and so forth in 
 
 61.  See, e.g., Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013); 467 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 
2006); Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 62.  See, e.g., Bridgeport Music, v. UMG Recordings, 585 F.3d 267, 278 (6th Cir. 
2009) (upholding jury verdict that use of short section from the song “Atomic Dog” in 
“D.O.G. in Me” was not fair use, despite finding that “‘D.O.G. in Me’ is certainly 
transformative (first factor), having a different theme, mood, and tone from Atomic Dog”); 
Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 803 n.18 (6th Cir. 2005) (no de 
minimis exception to copyright infringement for “the taking of a millisecond of sound from 
another’s copyrighted recording, or the taking of a more extensive portion that has been 
modified to the point of being completely unrecognizable or impossible to associate with the 
copied recording”). But see Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1192 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(finding no infringement of underlying musical composition in case where sound recording 
was licensed). 
 63.  See, e.g., Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 34 
(2003) (“Federal trademark law ‘has no necessary relation to invention or discovery, but 
rather, by preventing competitors from copying a source-identifying mark, reduce[s] the 
customer’s costs of shopping and making purchasing decisions, and helps assure a producer 
that it (and not an imitating competitor) will reap the financial, reputation-related rewards 
associated with a desirable product.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); 
TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 34 (2001) (“The Lanham Act 
does not exist to reward manufacturers for their innovation in creating a particular device; 
that is the purpose of the patent law and its period of exclusivity.”). 
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communicating with consumers about their own products. Many trademark 
doctrines aim to police these tradeoffs between a mark’s value as an exclusive 
indication of source and its broader communicative value. Thus, for example, 
trademark law prefers marks that are “inherently distinctive” because 
protection of those marks impinges less on communicative value.64 Descriptive 
marks must acquire “secondary meaning” before they can receive legal 
protection—meaning they must, over time, acquire source significance among 
the relevant consuming public.65 Moreover, trademarks that are or become 
“generic,” in that they are used to identify a type of product rather than its 
source, are never protected.66 The descriptive and nominative fair use doctrines 
recognize the value to consumers of communicative and critical uses of 
otherwise protected marks,67 and courts use a variety of tools to insulate certain 
uses from liability because of free speech concerns.68 
Of particular relevance to design, trademark law has recently become more 
reticent to protect product design features. In general, trademark law extends 
protection to at least two species of trade dress: product packaging and product 
design. The Supreme Court, however, has expressed skepticism about the 
likelihood that consumers will view product design primarily as an indicator of 
source. According to the Court in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, 
Inc, product packaging, is used “most often to identify the product’s source of 
the product.”69 By contrast, “[c]onsumer predisposition to equate [product 
design features] with the source does not exist” because “[c]onsumers are 
aware of the reality that, almost invariably, even the most unusual of product 
designs—such as a cocktail shaker shaped like a penguin—is intended not to 
identify the source, but to render the product itself more useful or more 
 
 64.  See 2 J.T. MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 
§ 11:18 (4th ed. 2013). 
 65.  Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 211 (2000) (“[A] mark 
has acquired distinctiveness, even if it is not inherently distinctive, if it has developed 
secondary meaning, which occurs when, ‘in the minds of the public, the primary significance 
of a [mark] is to identify the source of the product rather than the product itself.’” (second 
alteration in original) (quoting  Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 851 n.11 
(1982)). 
 66.  MCCARTHY, supra note 64, § 12:1. 
 67.  See KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 123 
(2004) (holding that a descriptive use may be considered fair under 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) 
even in the face of some amount of confusion); Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Tabari, 
610 F.3d 1171, 1775-83 (9th Cir. 2010) (applying the nominative fair use doctrine to insulate 
from liability use of the Lexus trademark in the domain name “buyalexus.com”); see also 
William McGeveran & Mark P. McKenna, Confusion Isn’t Everything, 89 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 253 (2013) (describing the importance of these defenses and advocating for doctrines 
that protect these interests more effectively). 
 68.  Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 997-1002 (2d Cir. 1989); Louis Vuitton 
Malletier S.A. v. Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc., 868 F. Supp. 2d 172, 174-75 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 69. 529 U.S. 205, 212 (2000). 
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appealing.”70 As a result, unlike product packaging, which can be inherently 
distinctive, trade dress protection is available for product design only upon a 
showing of secondary meaning. This differential treatment is particularly 
appropriate, according to the Court, because a producer “can ordinarily obtain 
protection for a design that is inherently source identifying (if any such exists), 
but that does not yet have secondary meaning, by securing a design patent or a 
copyright for the design.”71  
Trademark protection for design is also limited by the functionality 
doctrine, which, like the useful article doctrine in copyright, refuses protection 
to certain useful product features. As we describe in the next Section, the 
functionality doctrine reflects trademark law’s subordination of its own static 
competition goals to patent law’s dynamic competition goals.  
II. “FUNCTIONALITY” DOCTRINES: PROGRESS, COMPETITION AND THE 
INTERSECTIONS BETWEEN IP REGIMES 
Product design lies at the intersection of the patent, copyright, and 
trademark regimes. Useful articles often have both utilitarian and aesthetic 
aspects, and at times their features serve as source identifiers in the 
marketplace. Patent, copyright, and trademark also have very distinct purposes, 
as we have discussed in Part I: patent law seeks to promote cumulative 
technological progress; copyright law seeks to promote quantity and variety of 
expression; and trademark law seeks to prevent parties from misleading 
purchasers about the source of their products. Each of these regimes balances 
exclusive rights with untrammeled availability in a different way that reflects 
its particular goals. When applied to product design, however, these regimes 
can work at cross-purposes, necessitating doctrinal mechanisms to sort things 
out. The primary means for doing so in the product design context are so-called 
“functionality” doctrines.72 Unfortunately, these doctrines are confusing and 
confused. We argue here that the analysis of Part I can be used both to make 
sense of these doctrines and to critique them. 
A. A (Utility) Patent Law Supremacy Principle 
The primary principle underlying all of these doctrines (and the reason for 
referring to these rather disparate rules as “functionality” doctrines) is what one 
might call a “patent law supremacy” principle, or more particularly, a “utility 
 
 70.  Id. at 212-13. 
 71.  Id. at 214. 
 72.  As mentioned earlier, see supra notes 37-38, copyright’s idea-expression 
distinction also polices the boundary between patent and copyright, but we do not discuss it 
in detail here. 
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patent law supremacy” principle. Copyright, trademark, and design patent each 
in their own way refuse protection to “useful” or “functional” features because 
those features are the exclusive province of utility patent law. Put differently, 
each of those systems subordinates its own policy goals to the dynamic 
competition goals of utility patent law, reserving to utility patent the 
responsibility for determining the circumstances under which utilitarian 
features may be copied by others.  
In copyright law, this principle goes back to the Supreme Court’s opinion 
in Baker v. Selden, which held that copyright would not extend to useful 
processes even if those processes were described in a work of authorship.73 As 
the Court explained: 
To give to the author of the book an exclusive property in the art described 
therein, when no examination of its novelty has ever been officially made, 
would be a surprise and a fraud upon the public. That is the province of 
letters-patent, not of copyright. The claim to an invention or discovery of an 
art or manufacture must be subjected to the examination of the Patent Office 
before an exclusive right therein can be obtained; and it can only be secured 
by a patent from the government.74 
Only patent law, with its requirement of novelty and thorough examination 
process, can be used to protect the system described in the book.75 And the lack 
of patent protection means more than just that the inventor cannot prevent 
others’ use via patent law—it means that the system “is open and free to the 
use of the public,”76 a conclusion copyright law may not undermine. Patent 
law’s primacy is due precisely to its cumulative view of technological progress, 
which requires not only that patentees have exclusive rights to what is patented 
but, equally importantly, that unpatented utilitarian elements remain available 
for use.  
The Supreme Court’s seminal 1954 Mazer v. Stein opinion77 also 
highlights copyright’s deference to utility patent law in particular, and its 
refusal to defer to design patent law. In Mazer, the Court held that statuettes 
designed to be used as lamp bases were copyrightable based in part on the 
conception of progress as diversity. Thus, the statuettes were copyrightable 
“works of art” because “[i]ndividual perception of the beautiful is too varied a 
power to permit a narrow or rigid concept of art.”78 But consistent with Baker 
 
 73.  101 U.S. 99 (1879). 
 74.  Id. at 102. 
 75.  The current statute expressly excludes from copyright protection “any idea, 
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless 
of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.” 17 
U.S.C. § 102(b) (2011). 
 76.  Id. at 104. 
 77.  347 U.S. 201, 212-14 (1954). 
 78.  Id. at 214. 
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v. Selden’s concern about trenching on utility patent law, the Court emphasized 
that copyright protection extended only to the expression embodied in the 
statuettes, not to the ideas or “mechanical or utilitarian aspects” embodied in 
them when used as lamp bases. The latter could be protected only by patents.79  
In notable contrast, the Court expressly rejected the argument that the 
statuettes should be denied copyright protection because the design of useful 
articles was the subject matter of design patents.80 According to the Court, 
“[n]either the Copyright Statute nor any other says that because a thing is 
patentable it may not be copyrighted. We should not so hold.”81 This logic is, 
of course, quite contrary to Baker v. Selden, where the fact that the system 
potentially was patentable was precisely the reason the Court held that it could 
not be copyrighted. Thus, the Court’s statement in Mazer can only be 
understood as making a radical distinction between utility and design patents: 
for the Court, copyright protection for useful features presents irreconcilable 
conflict, while copyright for the design of articles of manufacture presents no 
conflict at all.  
The extension of copyright to expressive aspects of useful articles created a 
difficult problem, however. How could the courts ensure that copyright did not 
ensnare utilitarian elements? Courts have attempted to answer this question 
with the doctrine of “separability,” a concept that has now been codified in the 
Copyright Act.82 As the Second Circuit explained in Carol Barnhardt, Inc. v. 
Economy Cover Corp.,83 “Congress has explicitly refused copyright protection 
for works of applied art or industrial design which have aesthetic or artistic 
features that cannot be identified separately from the useful article. Such works 
are not copyrightable regardless of the fact that they may be ‘aesthetically 
satisfying and valuable.’”84 The mannequins at issue in that case thus were not 
copyrightable because their features could not “be conceptualized as existing 
independently of their utilitarian function.”85  
 
 
 79.  Id. at 212. 
 80.  Id. at 217 (“We do hold that the patentability of the statuettes, fitted as lamps or 
unfitted, does not bar copyright as works of art.”). 
 81.  Id. 
 82.  17 U.S.C. § 101 (“[T]he design of a useful article, as defined in this section, shall 
be considered a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only if, and only to the extent that, such 
design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified separately 
from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.”). 
   83.  773 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1985). 
 84.  Id. at 418 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 55 (1976)). 
 85.  Id. 
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Mannequins at issue in Carol Barnhardt86 
 
Brandir International, Inc. v. Cascade Pacific Lumber Co.87 addressed the 
copyrightability of an aesthetically pleasing bike rack:  
 
 
Bike rack at issue in Brandir88 
 
The Second Circuit clarified that the requisite separability between aesthetic 
and utilitarian elements could be either physical or conceptual, and it adopted a 
test of conceptual separability that it derived from an article by Professor 
Denicola: “[I]f design elements reflect a merger of aesthetic and functional 
considerations, the artistic aspects of a work cannot be said to be conceptually 
separable from the utilitarian elements. Conversely, where design elements can 
be identified as reflecting the designer’s artistic judgment exercised 
 
   86.  Id. at 425-26 figs.1, 2, 3 & 4. 
 87.  834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987). 
   88.  JOANNE GERE, BRANDIR INT’L, INC., THE ORIGINAL RIBBON BIKE RACK, at 2 (2010) 
(brochure), available at http://www.ribbonrack.com/pdfs/01%20RIBBON%20RACK 
%20CATALOG.pdf. 
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independently of functional influences, conceptual separability exists.”89  
 There is considerable debate about the proper test for conceptual 
separability. Professor Nimmer’s treatise on copyright, for example, put it 
somewhat differently: “conceptual separability exists where there is any 
substantial likelihood that even if the article had no utilitarian use it would still 
be marketable to some significant segment of the community simply because of 
its aesthetic qualities.”90 And the district court in Pivot Point preferred 
Professor Goldstein’s test: “a pictorial, graphic or sculptural feature 
incorporated in the design of a useful article is conceptually separable if it can 
stand on its own as work of art traditionally conceived, and if the useful article 
in which it is embodied would be equally useful without it.”91 For present 
purposes, however, the point is that, however formulated, copyright’s 
separability doctrine is intended to ensure that utilitarian aspects of useful 
articles are kept free from copyright exclusivity. 
Trade dress protection for product design presents much the same issue. 
Trade dress serves its source-indicating function only if its use is exclusive. On 
the other hand, trade dress protection, like copyright, has the potential to extend 
exclusive rights to unpatented utilitarian elements of an industrial design. This 
might occur when patented aspects of a product’s appearance become signifiers 
of source during the patent term, when the patentee is the exclusive provider of 
the patented goods. In those circumstances, enforcing exclusive rights through 
trade dress law undermines the balance contemplated by patent law, which 
presumes that those useful features will pass into the public domain when the 
patent expires. As the Court said in Singer Manufacturing Co. v. June 
Manufacturing Co.: 
It is self evident that the expiration of a patent the monopoly created by it 
ceases to exist, and the right to make the thing formerly covered by the patent 
becomes public property. It is upon this condition that the patent is granted. It 
follows, as a matter of course, that on the termination of the patent there 
passes to the public the right to make the machine in the form in which it was 
constructed during the patent.92 
 
 89.  Id. at 1145 (construing Robert C. Denicola, Applied Art and Industrial Design: A 
Suggested Approach to Copyright in Useful Articles, 67 MINN. L. REV. 707, 709-17 (1983)); 
see also Pivot Point Int’l, Inc. v. Charlene Prods., Inc., 372 F.3d 913, 920-31 (7th Cir. 2004) 
(surveying “the key stages of doctrinal development” in separability case law, and ultimately 
applying Denicola’s conceptual separability test to conclude that the expression on a 
mannequin’s face was entitled to copyright protection). 
 90.  1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.08[B] 
(2009), quoted in Pivot Point Int’l, Inc., 372 F.2d at 923; Carol Barnhart, 773 F.2d at 421. 
 91.  Pivot Point, 372 F.3d at 917 (quoting 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, 
LAW & PRACTICE § 2.5.3, at 109 (1989)). 
 92.  163 U.S. 169, 185 (1896); see also Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 
119-20 (1938) (Where shredded wheat was made in a “pillow-shaped” form during the terms 
of relevant utility and design patents, “upon expiration of the patents the form, as well as the 
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  Because “unpatented design and utilitarian conceptions” provide “the 
baseline of free competition”93 that produces the “ordinary innovation” upon 
which the patent incentive builds,94 trade dress law subordinates its static 
competition goals to patent law’s dynamic goals. It does so now primarily 
through the functionality doctrine, which polices the boundary between trade 
dress and patent, declaring patent law’s competition norms supreme with 
respect to certain features—only patent law can alter the competitive baseline 
for functional features, with respect to which parties are otherwise free to 
compete on price and quality even if those features indicate source.  
In TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc.,95 the Court 
emphasized that “[trade dress protection] does not exist to reward 
manufacturers for their innovation in creating a particular device; that is the 
purpose of the patent law and its period of exclusivity.”96 For this reason, “[a] 
utility patent is strong evidence that the features therein claimed are functional 
[and thus trade dress protection is unavailable].”97 Importantly, however, the 
Court also made clear that the patent system trumped trade dress even for 
unpatented utilitarian elements because “[a]llowing competitors to copy will 
have salutary effects in many instances.”98 Thus, “[w]hether a utility patent has 
expired or there has been no utility patent at all, a product design which has a 
particular appearance may be functional because it is ‘essential to the use or 
purpose of the article’ or ‘affects the cost or quality of the article.’”99 Patent 
law, not trade dress law, determines whether a utilitarian element is available 
for use by follow-on inventors, whether or not the element has ever been 
patented, and it does so regardless of whether alternative designs are available 
to reach the same utilitarian result.100 If technological progress depends on 
cumulative invention, this “supremacy principle” is eminently reasonable. 
There are other options available for indicating source to consumers—
including product packaging, labeling, and the like. 
 
name, was dedicated to the public”). 
 93.  Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 156 (1989). 
 94.  KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 427 (2006). 
 95.  532 U.S. 23 (2001). 
 96.  Id. at 34. 
 97.  Id. at 29. 
 98.  Id. at 29. 
 99.  Id. at 35 (quoting Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10 
(1982)). 
 100.  Id. at 33-34 (“Here, the functionality of the spring design means that competitors 
need not explore whether other spring juxtapositions might be used. The dual-spring design 
is not an arbitrary flourish in the configuration of MDI’s product; it is the reason the device 
works. Other designs need not be attempted.”). 
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B. Grappling with the Interplay Between Trade Dress and Aesthetic 
Expression 
There is much less clarity regarding the scope of trademark protection for 
aesthetic expression, whether or not that expression is protected by copyright. 
In Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.,101 the Supreme Court 
denied relief under the Lanham Act for the sale of a documentary film that was 
essentially an unattributed edited version of a television program. The 
television program had fallen out of copyright and into the public domain 
because the copyright owner failed to renew.102 The Court decided the case by 
narrowly construing the “origin of goods” language in § 43(a) of the Lanham 
Act,103 holding that only confusion about the origin of tangible goods (rather 
than regarding the origin of the creative content) counted for Lanham Act 
purposes.104 But this construction was clearly motivated by a principle of 
copyright supremacy. Citing Kellogg and TrafFix, the Court declared that 
“[t]he right to copy, and to copy without attribution, once a copyright has 
expired, like ‘the right to make [an article whose patent has expired]—
including the right to make it in precisely the shape it carried when patented—
passes to the public.’”105 Allowing false designation of origin claims for 
unattributed copying of creative content would undermine copyright’s 
limitations, in the Court’s view, just as allowing the trade dress claim in 
TrafFix would have undermined the limitations of patent law.  
Despite the Supreme Court’s discussion in Dastar and its recognition in 
Wal-Mart of the role that product design plays in rendering products “more 
useful or more appealing,”106 trade dress doctrine has not given the same level 
of deference to either copyright or design patent law as it has to utility patent 
law. The primary tool for limiting trade dress protection of aesthetic product 
design features is the semantically awkward “aesthetic functionality” doctrine. 
While earlier cases had treated design patents and utility patents equivalently, 
during the last half of the twentieth century courts relaxed their previous 
general insistence that unpatented designs be available for copying.107 Rather 
 
 101.  539 U.S. 23 (2003). 
 102.  Id. at 26. 
 103.  Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2011) (“Any person who, on or in 
connection with any goods or services . . . uses in commerce . . . any false designation of 
origin . . . , which (A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to 
the . . . origin . . . of his or her goods . . . , or (B) . . . misrepresents the . . . geographic origin 
of his or her or another’s persons goods . . . shall be liable . . . .”). 
 104.  Dastar, 539 U.S. at 37. 
 105.  Id. at 33 (alteration in original) (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 374 
U.S. 225, 230 (1964)). 
 106.  See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text. 
 107.  Under this old view, unfair competition law could, at most, require labeling. See 
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 232-33 & n.9 (1964); Compco Corp. v. 
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than working from a competitive baseline of free copying,108 courts 
increasingly sought to determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether trade dress 
protection of particular features would impose competitive harm in the static 
market for the particular type of product. A feature would be “functional” 
under this rubric only if it was a “competitive necessity” in the present market, 
meaning that alternatives were unavailable.109  
While TrafFix rejected this view with respect to mechanical functionality 
and emphasized the functionality doctrine’s channeling function vis-à-vis 
utility patent law,110 courts have more uniformly adopted the competitive 
necessity approach to “aesthetic” design features (the color of a pill, the shape 
of a stacking tray, etc.).111 This is the approach the Supreme Court seemed to 
endorse in TrafFix by stating that   “[i]t is proper to inquire into a significant 
non-reputation-related disadvantage in cases of aesthetic functionality.”112 As 
explained in an extensive and influential opinion by Judge Posner, for example, 
an aesthetic feature would be deemed functional only if “without it other 
producers of the product could not compete effectively.”113 In other words, the 
aesthetic functionality doctrine considers whether trade dress protection for 
particular aesthetic elements will reduce the market availability of consumers’ 
preferred options enough to give the trade dress owner an unfair advantage 
(and, presumably, harm consumers by allowing the owner to charge monopoly 
rents). Courts adopting the competitive necessity approach embrace product 
differentiation, which trade dress protection promotes, so long as the alternative 
 
Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 238 (1964); Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 
U.S. 111, 120 (1938); see also Ralph S. Brown, Design Protection: An Overview, 34 UCLA 
L. Rev. 1341 (1987); Mark P. McKenna, (Dys)functionality, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 823 (2011). 
 108.  Paul Goldstein, Copyright, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 79, 84 (1992); McKenna 
supra note 107, at 836-43. 
 109.  In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1339, 1341 (C.C.P.A. 1982). 
 110.  Some courts have clung to the competitive need view of functionality even after 
TrafFix, see Valu Eng’g, Inc. v. Rexnord Corp., 278 F.3d 1268, 1276-77 (Fed. Cir. 2002), 
but most courts have now come to understand TrafFix as rejecting that view, see, e.g., 
Groeneveld Trans. Efficiency, Inc. v. Lubecore, Int’l, Inc., 730 F.3d 494, 506-07 (6th Cir. 
2013) (rejecting the plaintiff’s “invitation to drift back into the error of inquiring about 
possible alternative designs”); Jay Franco & Sons, Inc. v. Franek, 615 F.3d 855, 857 (7th 
Cir. 2010) (“[P]atent law alone protects useful designs from mimicry; the functionality 
doctrine polices the division of responsibilities between patent and trademark law by 
invalidating marks on useful designs.”); Tie Tech, Inc. v. Kinedyne Corp., 296 F.3d 778, 786 
(9th Cir. 2002) (“[A] product’s manufacturer ‘does not have rights under trade dress law to 
compel its competitors to resort to alternative designs which have a different set of 
advantages and disadvantages. Such is the realm of patent law.’” (quoting Leatherman Tool 
Grp., Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 199 F.3d 1009, 1014 n.7 (9th Cir. 1999))). 
 111.  See, e.g., Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 853 (1982) 
(affirming a district court’s finding that pill colors were functional); W.T. Rogers Co., Inc. v. 
Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 338-41 (7th Cir. 1985). 
 112.  TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mkting. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 33 (2001). 
 113.  W.T. Rogers, 778 F.2d at 346. 
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designs available to competitors are not so inadequate as not to be meaningful 
alternatives at all.114   
Is trade dress law’s disparate treatment of utilitarian and aesthetic features 
consistent with the distinction we have made between patent law’s notion of 
cumulative progress for utilitarian innovations and copyright law’s notion of 
quantity and variety as definitive of aesthetic progress? We think not. To begin 
with, we believe that the competitive necessity test often is applied incorrectly 
by courts even on its own terms. In assessing competitive necessity, courts 
often have concluded that aesthetic features (in general, not just those at issue 
in specific cases) are not competitively necessary because competitors can 
simply develop their own, different, aesthetically pleasing features (much more 
easily, they imply, than they can develop mechanically functional features). 
This conclusion rests on a premise that there is a vast array of similarly 
attractive aesthetic features from which to choose.115 According to Professor 
McCarthy, “[T]he range of possible aesthetic designs and configurations is as 
infinite as are the tastes that desire them, [so] according trademark protection to 
aesthetic features would not greatly hinder competition.”116 
The view that protection for aesthetic or creative features imposes little 
cost because of the many available alternatives also is evident in arguments 
about the economic consequences of copyright protection. Some commentators 
argue that copyrights impose no significant barriers to entry because 
competitors can always produce their own functionally equivalent works.117 
 
 114.  In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1342-43 (C.C.P.A. 1982) 
(design was not functional where “the functions of appellant’s bottle can be performed 
equally well by containers of innumerable designs and, thus, no one is injured in 
competition”). 
 115.  See Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 633-34 (7th Cir. 1993) (rejecting the 
argument that trademark protection for product configurations are anticompetitive and 
suggesting that such protection benefits consumers and encourages creative marketing). 
 116.  1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 
§ 7:81 (4th ed. 2010) (quoting Deborah J. Krieger, Note, The Broad Sweep of Aesthetic 
Functionality: A Threat to Trademark Protection of Aesthetic Product Features, 51 
FORDHAM L. REV. 345, 380 (1982)); see also Kohler, 12 F.3d at 648 (Cudahy, J., dissenting) 
(“The argument for distinguishing between the subjects of design and utility patents is that, 
although freedom to copy functional features may be essential to competition, freedom to 
copy aesthetic features is not essential.” (citing W.T. Rogers, 778 F.2d at 339 (trademark 
protection for “ornamental, fanciful shapes and patterns” does not hinder competition))). 
 117.  See, e.g., Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Product Differentiation, 79 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 212, 218-19 (2004) (arguing that the idea-expression dichotomy, which precludes 
protection for the underlying ideas of a work and therefore leaves others “free to create 
alternative works with the same functional characteristics as any existing work,” effectively 
“dissipates authors’ monopoly power”); id. at 218 n.16 (“There are no barriers preventing 
another author from putting pen to paper and attempting to create a substitute for any written 
work. In other words, although copyright prohibits others form copying the specific words 
penned by J.K. Rowling without her permission, it does nothing to prevent any other person 
from writing stories about a school where children learn to perform magic. The inputs 
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There is, according to this argument, no competitive cost to giving J.K. 
Rowling exclusive rights to Harry Potter, because each of us can write our own 
series of novels about a wizard boy. In this view, the idea-expression 
dichotomy and the related exclusions of 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) adequately protect 
the competitive market because those rules preclude copyright protection for 
the really important features—the ideas and the functional aspects.  
Even if progress in aesthetic expression focuses on encouraging variety and 
diversity, it does not follow that consumers are equally interested in the entire 
range of that diversity at any given time. Competitive necessity is a static 
notion and must be evaluated in light of the range of consumer preferences in 
the current market. Yet the generally dismissive view of the importance of 
aesthetic or ornamental features to consumers persists even in the face of clear 
evidence (not least of which is the fact that access to the feature is being 
litigated) that exclusive control of those features often gives a competitive 
advantage.118 As one of us has previously argued, the belief that aesthetic 
features are sometimes competitively important is the premise of the design 
patent system itself: 
[I]f it were generally true that competitors are at no disadvantage when they 
are denied access to aesthetic or ornamental features, then design patents 
would have little value. That we have a design patent system, and that the 
system is actually used by designers for the purpose of excluding others from 
using ornamental design features, suggests that those features sometimes are 
competitively significant. Indeed it seems so obviously true that ornamental 
design can be competitively important that the assertion to the contrary can 
only be seen as a normative claim that competitors should not be able to copy 
aesthetic features masquerading as an empirical claim about the need to do 
so.119 
Second, the competitive necessity test is in conflict with copyright’s theory 
of progress. The competitive necessity test may be analogized to copyright’s 
doctrine of merger, which denies copyright protection when a particular form 
of expressing idea is needed to express the idea. Copyright has other doctrines 
 
needed to create substitutes for more complex media are generally freely available.”); see 
also Goldstein, supra note 108, at 84 (arguing that because “one author’s expression will 
always be substitutable for another’s” copyright will generally not create monopoly power); 
Edmund W. Kitch, Elementary and Persistent Errors in the Economic Analysis of 
Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1727, 1730, 1734 (2000) (arguing that “copyrights 
do not prevent competitors from creating works with the same functional characteristics” and 
therefore “almost all copyrights . . . are not monopolies”); Douglas A. Smith, Collective 
Administration of Copyright: An Economic Analysis, 8 RES. IN L. & ECON. 137, 139 (1986) 
(“The potential monopoly power for individual holders of copyright whose works must 
compete with each other is in most instances not likely to be substantial.”). 
 118.  See Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Is Pepsi Really A Substitute for Coke? 
Market Definition in Antitrust and IP, 100 GEO. L.J. 2055, 2080-91 (2012) (arguing that IP-
based product differentiation has this effect more often than commonly recognized). 
 119.  McKenna, supra note 107, at 847. 
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to promote creative progress, however.  The scenes-à-faire and idea-expression 
doctrines deny copyright protection to basic expressive components in order to 
ensure that they remain broadly available to creators. Moreover, while 
trademark has its own fair use doctrines, they are notoriously unclear and often 
redundant of the likelihood of confusion inquiry,120 and in any event they are 
much less frequently applicable to trade dress. With the possible exception of 
the First Amendment-related defenses, none of trademark law’s defensive 
doctrines share copyright fair use’s emphasis on transformative uses, which 
courts have used to facilitate diversity in cases such as the appropriation art 
cases discussed above. Several of copyright’s doctrines limiting exclusive 
rights apply without reference to whether the exempted elements are 
“necessary” for a creator is to compete in the current market. Thus, for 
example, in W.T. Rogers, which involved a hexagonally shaped stacking tray, 
Judge Posner opined that “even with the hexagon appropriated,” an “infinity of 
geometrical patterns would remain open to competitors”—for example, “an 
oval, a pentagon, a trapezoid, a parallelogram, an octagon, a rectangle covered 
with arabesques, or machicolated, or saw-toothed.”121 While access to these 
basic geometric shapes may not be a competitive necessity, they almost 
certainly are among the basic aesthetic elements that copyright excludes from 
its coverage. The Supreme Court’s rejection in Qualitex of the argument that 
“colors are in limited supply” seems similarly problematic.122  
Because trade dress doctrine does not recognize these limitations on 
copyright’s coverage of aesthetic features, it can in principle be used to obtain 
exclusive rights that copyright doctrine (or design patent doctrine, to which we 
turn shortly) would preclude. This is not to suggest that it is never appropriate 
to grant trade dress protection to the use of a particular color on a particular 
good. Perhaps the use of a green-gold color on a dry cleaning pad has 
insufficient originality to be the subject of copyright protection and is 
insufficiently attractive to purchasers to provide a competitive edge. In such a 
case, trade dress protection may be appropriate. The point is only that 
grounding the doctrine of “aesthetic functionality” entirely in concerns about 
static competition is inconsistent with the copyright supremacy approach taken 
by the Supreme Court in Dastar.   
Today’s aesthetic functionality doctrine also treats utility patents and 
design patents entirely differently. Thus, while TrafFix made no explicit 
reference to design patents, the Court suggested that it might be possible to 
“carry the heavy burden of showing that [a feature claimed in a utility patent] is 
 
 120.  See McGeveran & McKenna, supra note 67. 
 121.  W.T. Rogers Co., Inc. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 343 (7th Cir. 1985); see also 
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods., 514 U.S. 159, 168 (1995) (rejecting an argument against 
trademarking colors on the grounds that “normally alternative colors will likely be available 
for similar use by others”). 
 122.  See Qualitex, 541 U.S. at 168-69. 
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not functional, for instance by showing that it is merely an ornamental, 
incidental, or arbitrary aspect of the device.”123 This dismissive treatment of 
“merely” ornamental features is in considerable tension with the Court’s 
approach the previous year in Wal-Mart,124 in which it downplayed the need 
for trade dress protection for product design on the ground that those features 
could be protected by design patents. TrafFix also suggested a different test for 
aesthetic features, stating that the inquiry into competitive necessity would still 
be appropriate in (at least) cases of aesthetic functionality, which the Court 
suggested was the issue in Qualitex regarding the “green-gold color of [a] 
laundry press pad.”125 The Court seemed simply to assume, without discussion, 
that aesthetic or ornamental features would not fall under Inwood’s rule that 
trade dress protection is unavailable for a feature that “is essential to the use or 
purpose of the article or . . . affects the cost or quality of the article.”126  
Lower courts have entrenched differential treatment of design and utility 
patents in other ways as well. Most significantly, while TrafFix made clear that 
utility patents are strong evidence of functionality, many courts have held that 
design patents covering the features at issue are evidence that the design is 
“ornamental,” rather than “functional”—and hence weigh against a finding of 
functionality.127 This differential treatment of the subject matter of utility and 
design patents is in significant conflict with longstanding Supreme Court 
precedent holding that there is a right to copy unpatented product features128 
because unpatented concepts “provide the baseline of free competition upon 
which the patent system’s incentive to creative effort depends.”129 As Judge 
Cudahy of the Seventh Circuit argued in his well-known dissent in Kohler,  that 
precedent made no distinction between utility and design patents.130 Moreover, 
 
 123.  TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 30 (2001) (emphasis 
added). 
 124.  529 U.S. 205 (2000). 
 125.  Id. at 33 (construing Qualitex, 541 U.S. at 170). The Court’s characterization of 
Qualitex has been criticized heavily by some commentators, who insist that Qualitex was not 
about aesthetic functionality. See, e.g., Christopher C. Larkin, Qualitex Revisited, 94 
TRADEMARK REP. 1017, 1032 (2004). 
 126.  Id. (quoting Inwood Labs, Inc. v. Ives Labs, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10 (1982)). 
 127.  See, e.g., In re Becton-Dickson, 675 F.3d 1368, 1380 (2012) (applying In re 
Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1342 n.3 (C.C.P.A. 1982)). 
 128.  Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 156 (1989); 
Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237-38 (1964); Sears, Roebuck & 
Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231-32 (1964); Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 
111, 116-17 (1938); Singer Manufacturing Co. v. June Manufacturing Co., 163 U.S. 169, 
185 (1896). 
 129.  Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 156; see also McKenna, supra note 107, at 840-43. 
 130.  Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 648 (7th Cir. 1993) (Cudahy, J., dissenting). 
See Katherine J. Strandburg, Rounding the Corner on Trade Dress: A Tribute to the 
Jurisprudence of Judge Richard D. Cudahy, 29 YALE J. ON REG. 387 (2012) for a detailed 
exploration of this dissent and its context. 
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the Supreme Court’s opinion in Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, 
Inc.,131 on which it relied in TrafFix, explicitly equated the social bargains 
involved in utility and design patenting, noting with respect to both that “[t]he 
attractiveness of [the patent] bargain, and its effectiveness in inducing creative 
effort and disclosure of the results of that effort, depend almost entirely on a 
backdrop of free competition in the exploitation of unpatented designs and 
innovations.”132 
This equation of design and utility patents was no accident, as (though it 
often goes unnoticed) the Supreme Court made many of its most well-known 
pronouncements about the importance of copying and competition in cases that 
involved design patents.133 Day-Brite, for example, had received a design 
patent on the lighting fixture at issue in Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, 
Inc., and it alleged design patent infringement along with unfair competition.134 
The design patent claim was no longer at issue at the Supreme Court level only 
because the Seventh Circuit had affirmed the district court’s finding that the 
design patent was invalid because the design was functional.135 Sears and 
Compco, like a number of cases before them, were quite clear that the only role 
for unfair competition law was to require labeling in order to avoid passing 
off.136 This understanding was based on the normative judgment that copying 
was generally legitimate if the copied design did not surmount the obviousness 
bar to design patenting or meet copyright’s separability requirement. Current 
aesthetic functionality doctrine, however, places no weight on maintaining the 
continued availability of unpatented design elements to promote design 
innovation.  
Whether this disparate treatment of design and utility patents is justified 
depends on how well design patent law is calibrated to achieve its purposes. 
Unfortunately, as we discuss in the next Section, design patent law lacks 
coherent conceptual underpinnings, which not only makes design patent 
doctrine problematic on its own terms, but it makes it impossible to determine 
the proper relationship between design patent and copyright and trademark 
protection.   
 
 131.  489 U.S. 141 (1989). 
 132.  Id. at 151. 
 133.  See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Compco Corp. 
v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964), rev’g 311 F.2d 26 (7th Cir. 1963). 
 134.  Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Compco Corp., 311 F.2d 26, 27 (7th Cir. 1963). 
 135.  See id. at 28 (“The District Court’s decision that the design of the cross ribs was 
functional and dictated by the limitations of the manufacturing process is fully supported by 
the evidence.”). 
 136.  See McKenna, supra note 107, at 836-43. 
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III. THE INHERENT CONTRADICTIONS OF THE DESIGN PATENT SYSTEM 
Despite its traditionally low profile, the design patent system is actually 
quite old.  So are its problems. Throughout its history the design patent system 
has cycled between very low patentability thresholds, resulting in back-door 
intrusions into the purview of the utility patent system, and ineffective attempts 
to solve that problem by imposing more utility patent-like requirements for 
design patent protection. We argue that the root cause of the design patent 
system’s problems is the fact that it has conceived of its subject matter in 
separationist terms, neglecting the intertwining of form and function that is the 
very hallmark of modern industrial design. The current system’s failed attempt 
to combine a patent-based nonobviousness inquiry with a standard of 
evaluation based entirely on aesthetics reflects this problem. 
Design patents were created to fill a perceived vacuum of protection. At 
the time Congress passed the first design patent statute in 1842, the design of 
articles of manufacture was excluded from copyright’s coverage, as well as 
from patent and trademark (or unfair competition) protection. Many of those 
involved in lobbying for the 1842 design patent statute were concerned 
primarily with surface ornamentation,137 but the statute did not limit protection 
to such “ornamental” designs. Instead, the statute’s coverage reflected its gap-
filling purpose. It covered “new and original” works created by the inventor’s 
“industry, genius, efforts, and expense” in a hodgepodge of categories 
otherwise unprotected by IP at the time: designs for “manufactures,” fabric 
designs, statues and other three-dimensional artwork, surface ornamentation of 
various sorts, and product “shape or configuration.”138 The statutory language 
does not seem to have been premised on any coherent foundation connecting 
the patentability standard to a theoretical conception of progress in industrial 
design. This is not especially surprising, given that copyright and patent 
doctrine were only beginning to develop into their present, distinct forms at the 
time. By the early twentieth century, however, the copyright and patent systems 
had largely settled into their current forms, tailored to different conceptions of 
 
 137.  See Jason J. Du Mont & Mark D. Janis, The Origins of the American Design 
Patent System, 88 IND. L.J. 837, 851-52 (2013). 
 138.  The original statute offered design patents to those who through their own 
industry, genius, efforts, and expense, may have invented or produced any new and original 
[1] design for a manufacture, whether of metal or other material or materials, or any new and 
original [2] design for the printing of woolen, silk, cotton, or other fabrics, or any new and 
original [3] design for a bust, statue, or bas relief or composition in alto or basso relievo, or 
any new and original [4] impression or ornament, or to be placed on any article of 
manufacture, the same being formed in marble or other material, or any new and useful [5] 
pattern, or print, or picture, to be either worked into or worked on, or printed or painted or 
cast or otherwise fixed on, any article of manufacture, or any new and original [6] shape or 
configuration of any article of manufacture not known or used by others.” Design Patent Act 
of 1842, ch. 263, § 3, 5 Stat. 543, 544. 
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progress for aesthetic expression and utilitarian technology. Unfortunately, 
design patent doctrine retains features of both systems without any coherent 
guiding principle.  
A. The Patent and Copyright Context at the Birth of the Design Patent 
System 
In 1842, the domains of copyright and patent law were much less clearly 
delineated than they are today, both individually and with respect to one 
another. For example, the terms of copyright and patent were more comparable, 
with copyright’s term being 28 years with a possibility of a 14-year renewal139 
and patent’s term 14 years with a possible 7-year extension.140 Most 
importantly, the basic thresholds for copyright and patent protection were much 
more similar (and less well-established) at the time. Courts had not yet 
developed patent law’s nonobviousness requirement, and the patent statute 
required only that a patented invention be “new” and “useful.”141 According to 
Curtis’s well-known 1849 patent treatise, while “mere colorable variations, or 
slight and unimportant changes” would not suffice, a patent would be awarded 
as long as the invention “ha[d] not substantially existed before.”142 To show 
that an invention was “substantially” new, it was enough to show that it was 
“better, more useful, or cheaper than the old.”143 Thus, at the time the design 
patent statute was enacted, the patentability standard appears to have required 
only rather minimal advances and, most importantly, paid no attention to 
whether the invention went beyond what the market would have produced in 
the ordinary course. In 1850, in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, the Court raised the 
patentability bar and established the standard on which the present-day 
nonobviousness requirement is based: “unless more ingenuity and skill . . . 
were required . . . than were possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted 
with the business, there was an absence of that degree of skill and ingenuity 
which constitute essential elements of every invention.”144 By demanding an 
inventive step beyond what would be produced by the “ordinary mechanic,” 
this standard recognizes the cumulative nature of technological progress. 
 
 139.  Copyright Act of 1831, ch. 16, § 2, 4 Stat. 436, 436-37. 
 140.  Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, §§ 6, 18, 5 Stat. 117, 119, 124-25. 
 141.  Id. § 6 (making patents available to “any person or persons having discovered or 
invented any new and useful art . . . not known or used by others before his or their 
discovery or invention thereof”). 
 142.  GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL 
INVENTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 6 (1st ed. 1849) (emphasis added), available 
at http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uc2.ark:/13960/t2w37v337;view=1up;seq=54. 
 143.  Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248, 255 (1850) (quoting CURTIS, 
supra note 142, at 7 n.3) (internal quotation mark omitted) (construing the plaintiff’s 
argument). 
 144.  Id. at 267. 
001--MCKENNA & STRANDBURG_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/27/2014 9:55 AM 
Fall 2013] PROGRESS AND COMPETITION IN DESIGN 33 
The original subject matter of copyright—books, maps, and charts—
consisted of works from which users could learn and advance “science,”145 
making them amenable to a conception of “progress” not so different from 
technological progress. In 1842, copyright was not far removed from this 
original conception, “historical or other print[s]” having been added to the list 
in 1802,146 and musical compositions and “prints or engravings” added only in 
1831.147 Not until 1870 was the statute amended to cover “painting, drawing, 
chromo, statue, statuary, and . . . models or designs intended to be perfected as 
works of the fine arts.”148 
Two opinions by Justice Story, in 1839149 and 1845150 respectively, 
considered the copyrightability of textbooks that combined excerpts from 
previous works. Story held that such combinations were potentially 
copyrightable because of the “labor[] and intellectual exertion” involved in 
“[t]he plan, the arrangement, and the combination” of the excerpts.151 Unlike in 
the patent law at the time, there was no consideration of whether the new 
arrangements were “better or worse” than prior arrangements. Improvement 
was “not a material inquiry in this case,”152 but something that would sort itself 
out in the market: “If worse, his work will not be used by the community at 
large; if better, it is very likely to be so used.”153  
Despite this difference, the patent and copyright standards imposed 
similarly low thresholds for protection during this pre-Hotchkiss period. 
Interestingly, Story justified the minimal standard for copyrightability by a 
concept of cumulative progress, noting that “[e]very book in literature, science 
 
 145.  According to Barton Beebe, “science” was “generally understood [at the founding] 
to refer to systematic theoretical and empirical knowledge (i.e., Wissenschaft)” as opposed to 
“useful arts” which referred to “technology or commercial practices.” See Beebe, supra note 
34, at 3-4. Moreover, “[w]hile ‘science’ sometimes covered the ‘general principles’ of the 
fine as well as the useful arts, it was nevertheless understood to be fundamentally distinct 
from these applied arts, particularly when the term ‘science’ was used in conjunction with 
‘arts.’” Id. at 4 (footnotes omitted). 
 146.  Copyright Act of 1802, ch. 36, § 2, 2 Stat. 171, 171. 
 147.  Copyright Act of 1831, ch. 16, § 1, 4 Stat. 436, 436. (“[T]he author or authors of 
any book or books, map, chart, or musical composition, which may be now made or 
composed, and not printed and published, or shall hereafter be made or composed, or who 
shall invent, design, etch, engrave, work, or cause to be engraved, etched, or worked from 
his own design, any print or engraving, and the executors, administrators, or legal assigns of 
such person or persons, shall have the sole right and liberty of printing, reprinting, 
publishing, and vending such book or books, map, chart, musical composition, print, cut, or 
engraving . . . .”). 
 148.  Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 198, 212. 
 149.  Gray v. Russell, 10 F. Cas. 1035 (C.C.D. Mass. 1839) (No. 5,728). 
 150.  Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4,436). 
 151.  Gray, 10 F. Cas. at 1037. 
 152.  Emerson, 8 F. Cas. at 621. 
 153.  Id. 
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and art, borrows, and must necessarily borrow, and use much which was well 
known and used before.”154 He compared the textbooks at issue to other works 
of a scholarly nature: from commentaries and treatises, which “for the most 
part, consist of selections from the works and criticisms of various former 
authors, arranged in a new form”;155 to eminent works of “antiquity,” whose 
authors “gathered much from the abundant stores of current knowledge and 
classical studies in their days”; and to maps, which are copyrightable despite 
the fact that all maps must “the more accurate they are, approach nearer in 
design and execution to each other.”156 For reasons that are unclear (but 
perhaps had to do with copyright’s limited scope at that time), he did not 
concern himself with the effects of a low originality standard on the availability 
of excerpts to be combined by these later authors.  
While generous to subject matter such as maps, charts, and “serious” 
books, copyright doctrine in the first half of the nineteenth century was much 
less hospitable to works of a commercial nature. In 1829, for example, a court 
denied copyright to a financial newspaper because “[copyright] is for the 
encouragement of learning and was not intended for the encouragement of 
mere industry, unconnected with learning and the sciences.”157 Copyright’s 
connection to aesthetic expression was made only much later. While the 
inclusion of works of “fine art” in the 1870 statute broke the connection 
between copyright and “learning and the sciences,” copyright continued to 
emphasize intellectual pursuits. In 1884, the Supreme Court upheld the 
copyrightability of photographs of Oscar Wilde against an argument that they 
were merely copied mechanistically from nature.158 The Court’s reasoning 
rested squarely on the photographers “intellectual invention” in “posing” the 
subject, “selecting and arranging the costume, draperies, and other various 
accessories,” “arranging the subject so as to present graceful outlines,” and so 
forth.159 The Court therefore left undecided the question of whether copyright 
was available for the more “mechanical reproduction” involved in the “ordinary 
production of a photograph.”160 Only in 1903 did the Court sweep away those 
distinctions entirely.  
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co. involved the copyrightability of 
circus posters depicting acts such as “an ordinary ballet,” “the Stirk family, 
performing on bicycles” and “men and women whitened to represent 
statues.”161 The Court refused to distinguish between these advertisements and 
 
 154.  Id. at 619. 
 155.  Gray, 10 F. Cas. at 1038. 
 156.  Emerson, 8 F. Cas. at 619. 
 157.  Clayton v. Stone, 5 F. Cas. 999, 1003 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1829) (No. 2,872). 
 158.  Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 60 (1884). 
 159.  Id. 
 160.  Id. at 59. 
 161.  188 U.S. 239, 248 (1903). 
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copyrightable “fine arts”: 
Certainly works are not the less connected with the fine arts because their 
pictorial quality attracts the crowd and therefore gives them a real use—if use 
means to increase trade and to help to make money. A picture is none the less 
a picture and none the less a subject of copyright that it is used for an 
advertisement. And if pictures may be used to advertise soap, or the theatre, or 
monthly magazines, as they are, they may be used to advertise a circus.162  
Thus, over time, partly through statutory amendment and partly through 
judicial interpretation, copyright protection was extended from its original 
focus on “science” to encompass first “fine arts” and then virtually any form of 
expression. During this expansion, the minimal originality requirement was 
maintained.163 Importantly, however, the justification for the minimal standard 
shifted. Justice Story had justified his minimal originality standard on the 
ground that all scholarly works built upon previous work. Bleistein’s rationale 
was founded instead on the mystery of artistic expression and its deeply 
personal nature: “The copy [made when drawing from nature] is the personal 
reaction of an individual upon nature. Personality always contains something 
unique. It expresses its singularity even in handwriting, and a very modest 
grade of art has in it something irreducible, which is one man’s alone.”164  
While Story insisted that it was “immaterial” to his decision whether the 
textbook at issue was better or worse than others, he was comfortable giving his 
own view that “the plaintiff’s method [was] a real and substantial improvement 
upon all the works which had preceded his.”165 He assumed that a work’s 
quality would be revealed by its success in the market. The Bleistein court, on 
the other hand, embraced a low copyrightability threshold because it considered 
courts unqualified to assess the artistic merit of a work of art. Moreover, the 
Court had equally little confidence in the market’s ability to do so, given that 
works of genius may be “repulsive until the public ha[s] learned the new 
language in which their author spoke.”166 Both the emphasis on personal 
expression and the concern with the unpredictability of artistic merit lead away 
from a patent-like conception of cumulative progress and toward the 
conception reflected in copyright doctrine today. 
In the 1840s, however, when the design patent system was first created, 
neither copyright nor patent doctrine was well developed. Both systems had 
relatively minimal standards for obtaining protection, while both also had at 
least somewhat cumulative conceptions of progress. The inherent contradiction 
 
 162.  Id. at 251. 
 163.  This requirement was given slightly more teeth, however, when Feist Publications, 
Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340 (1991), undermined the “sweat of the 
brow” justification for copyright. 
 164.  Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 300. 
 165.  Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 621 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4,436). 
 166.  Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 251. 
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between minimal thresholds for protection and cumulative conceptions of 
progress thus infected both patent and copyright at that time. By the early 
twentieth century, they had evolved the very distinct but more or less internally 
consistent approaches discussed in Part I. But design patent law never 
benefitted from this evolution.   
B. The Design Patent Treadmill 
1. Design patents pre-1952 
The 1842 design patent statute covered (among other things) “any new and 
original shape or configuration of any article of manufacture not known or used 
by others,”167 echoing the patentability standard of the time. It also required 
applicants to affirm that their designs had resulted from “their own industry, 
genius, efforts, and expense,”168 a standard which echoed the emphasis on 
investment of labor in some contemporaneous copyright decisions.169 Little is 
known about how the patent office interpreted the statutory requirements 
during the design patent system’s first few years.170 Few patents were issued 
and there were no reported cases dealing with patentability standards.171  
The first recorded judicial interpretation of the design patentability 
standard was in 1865, following a revision of the statute in 1861,172 which left 
the patentability standard intact. In Wooster v. Crane,173 the court invalidated a 
design patent on a rhombus-shaped reel for storing dress trimmings. Though 
the court referred to design patent’s requirement of “industry, genius, efforts 
and expense,” the opinion did not really inquire into the difficulty of the 
inventive process. Instead, the court based its conclusion on the fact that the 
design was no better than previous designs. The court observed that “the shape 
[was] a common one in many articles of manufacture” and that “[n]o advantage 
whatever is pretended to be derived from the adoption of the form selected by 
the plaintiff.”174 The emphasis on lack of “advantage” is reminiscent of the pre-
Hotchkiss utility patent requirement that an invention be “better, more useful, 
or cheaper than the old.”175  Moreover, the choice of a rhombus “was simply an 
 
 167.  Design Patent Act of 1842, ch. 263, § 3, 5 Stat. 543, 544. 
 168.  Id. 
 169.  See, e.g., Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26, 60-61 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869) (No. 8,136) 
(citing Kelly v. Morris, L.R. 1 Eq. 697 (1866)). 
 170.  Jason J. Du Mont, A Non-Obvious Design: Reexamining the Origins of the Design 
Patent Standard, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 531, 545 (2010). 
 171.  Id. 
 172.  Design Patent Act of 1861, ch. 88, 12 Stat. 246. 
 173.  Wooster v. Crane, 30 F. Cas. 612 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1865) (No. 18,036). 
 174.  Id. at 612 
 175.  Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248, 255 (1850) (quoting CURTIS, 
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arbitrary, chance selection of many well known shapes, all equally well 
adapted to the purpose.”176  Thus, this first case appears to have found the 
design patent invalid, at least in part, because there was no necessary 
relationship between form and function.  
The 1869 patent commissioner opinion in Ex parte Crane177 marked the 
beginning of design patent law’s intrusion into the terrain of utility patents. In 
that case, the same Mr. Crane had applied for a design patent on a box for 
holding furs after his application for a utility patent was rejected under the 
Hotchkiss standard.178 The design patent application initially was rejected by 
the examiner, a decision upheld by the appellate board, because the design was 
not “for ornament merely.”179 Had this decision stood, it would essentially 
have imposed a strict separability requirement, limiting design patents to 
features without any function whatsoever. The Patent Commissioner 
overturned the rejection, however, noting that the “line of distinction between 
what is useful and what is merely ornamental is, in some cases, very 
indefinite,” and that “designs for utility,” no less than purely ornamental 
designs, “add to the market value and salability” of manufactured articles.180  
Later that same year, in Ex parte Bartholomew,181 a different 
Commissioner went even further, stating that “no element of the artistic or 
ornamental” was required for design patentability.182 The Commissioner in 
Bartholomew also stated explicitly that the design patent standard was much 
lower than the standard for utility patents: “From the nature of the subject-
matter, there must always be more latitude in the issue of patents for trifling 
changes of form or outline, since it is only necessary that such changes should 
constitute a new design to entitle them to a patent of this class.”183 
Congress passed a number of intellectual property reforms in 1870 as part 
of a post-Civil War overhaul of federal legislation. The Act of 1870 included 
the first federal trademark provisions184 and extended copyright protection to 
“any . . . painting, drawing, chromo, statue, statuary, [or] models or designs 
 
supra note 142, at 7 n.3) (internal quotation mark omitted) (construing the plaintiff’s 
argument). 
 176.  Wooster, 30 F. Cas. at 612 (emphasis added). 
 177.  1869 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 7. 
 178.  Id. at 7. 
 179.  Id. at 8. 
 180.  Id. at 7. 
 181.  1869 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 103. 
 182.  Id. at 105. 
 183.  Id. 
 184.  Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, §§ 77-84, 16 Stat. 198, 210-12. The trademark 
portions of the Act were struck down in The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 99 (1879) 
(invalidating the trademark legislation of 1870 and the Act of Aug. 14, 1876, ch. 274, 
19 Stat. 141, which imposed criminal sanctions against those who fraudulently used, sold, or 
counterfeited trademarks). 
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intended to be perfected as works of the fine arts.”185 Perhaps in an effort to 
distinguish the subject matter of design patents from the newly copyrightable 
subject matter, the reforms also redefined the categories of design patent 
protection to require that a patentable “shape or configuration of any article of 
manufacture” be not only “new” and “original,” but also “useful.”186 The 1870 
reforms thus solidified design patents’ intrusion into utility patent territory, 
while leaving the minimal design patentability standard in place. Under this 
standard, one could obtain design patents on minimally original designs, even if 
those designs were primarily utilitarian in nature, thereby evading the more 
demanding requirements of utility patentability.  
Shortly after the enactment of the 1870 Act, a new patent commissioner 
sought to deal with this problem by simultaneously importing a Hotchkiss-like 
standard and refocusing the design patent inquiry on aesthetic, rather than 
utilitarian, creativity.187 Though courts initially resisted importation of the 
Hotchkiss approach into design patent doctrine,188 in Smith v. Whitman Saddle, 
the Supreme Court explicitly affirmed that, in order to be patentable, a design 
must result from “[t]he exercise of the inventive or originative faculty.”189 To 
further clarify that design patents were not substitutes for utility patents, 
Congress in 1902 amended the design patent statute, removing the word 
“useful,” and replacing it with the word “ornamental.”190 As a result, under the 
new statute, design patents were available to “[a]ny person who [had] invented 
any new, original, and ornamental design for an article of manufacture.”191  
Unfortunately, while either of these two steps might have improved things 
if made independently, in combination they led right back into the quagmire. 
Having melded the Hotchkiss standard from utility patent law with subject 
matter defined by ornamentality, courts were left with the task of assessing the 
size of the step forward reflected in a particular aesthetic expression, a task that 
copyright had found impossible. Specifically, courts were required to determine 
whether a design reflected some inventive step beyond what came before, but 
there was no conceptual basis on which they could make such a judgment.  
C. The Conceptual Incoherence of the Modern Design Patent Regime 
Design patent law’s conceptual incoherence was solidified when the 1952 
Patent Act purported to apply identical novelty and nonobviousness 
 
 185.  § 86, 16 Stat. at 212. 
 186.  § 71, 16 Stat. at 209-10. 
 187.  See Dumont, supra note 170, at 568-69. 
 188.  Id. at 550-51. 
 189.  148 U.S. 674, 679 (1893). 
 190.  Act of May 9, 1902, ch. 783, 32 Stat. 193, 193. 
 191.  Id. 
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requirements to utility and design patents. The trouble, of course, is that the 
nonobviousness requirement is rooted in a cumulative conception of progress. 
It demands that patents be awarded only when required to incentivize advances 
that go beyond the dynamic competitive baseline. Unfortunately, as copyright 
doctrine recognizes, there is no workable standard for measuring the “size” of 
an aesthetic advance. As a result, application of the nonobviousness 
requirement to utility and design patents is identical in name only. The Federal 
Circuit has coped with this inherent contradiction by adopting a very relaxed 
nonobviousness standard for design patents.192  
To find a design obvious, a court must begin by identifying a single 
“primary reference,” the “design characteristics of which are basically the same 
as the claimed design.”193 If and only if the court can identify such a primary 
reference, then other references may be used to modify it if the references are 
“so related [to the primary reference] that the appearance of certain ornamental 
features in one would suggest the application of those features to the other.”194 
Not surprisingly, this stringent test leads to few invalidations or rejections. To 
take one recent example, the Federal Circuit in High Point Design LLC v. 
Buyers Direct, Inc.,195 reversed the district court’s summary judgment finding 
of obviousness regarding the following design, which the court characterized as 
disclosing “slippers with an opening for a foot that contain a fuzzy (fleece) 
lining and have a smooth outer surface”:196 
 
Slipper design at issue in High Point Design197 
 
The district court had identified two models of slippers sold by Woolrich as 
primary references—the “Penta” and the “Laurel Hill”:  
 
 
 192.  See Janice M. Mueller & Daniel Harris Brean, Overcoming the “Impossible Issue” 
of Nonobviousness in Design Patents, 99 KY. L.J. 419, 425 (2011). 
 193.  Durling v. Spectrum Furniture Co., Inc., 101 F.3d 100, 103 (Fed. Cir. 1996) 
(internal quotation mark omitted). 
 194.  Id. (quoting In re Borden, 90 F.3d 1570, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1996)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 195.  730 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
 196.  Id. at 1307. 
   197.  U.S. Patent No. D598,183 figs.1, 4, 7 & 9 (filed Jan. 22, 2009). 
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“Penta” slipper (left); “Laurel Hill” slipper (right)198 
 
According to the district court, the Penta “look[ed] indistinguishable from 
the drawing shown in the ‘183 Patent,” and the Laurel Hill, “while having 
certain differences with the Penta slipper that [were] insubstantial and might be 
referred to as streamlining, nonetheless ha[d] the precise look that an ordinary 
observer would think of as a physical embodiment of the drawings shown on 
the ‘183 Patent.”199  
The district court then identified the following two designs, disclosed in 
prior design patents, as secondary references, particularly focusing on their 
disclosure of small dots on the bottom surface:  
 
 
Secondary References200 
 
Combining these references, the district court found the design claimed in 
the ‘183 Patent obvious.201 The Federal Circuit reversed, faulting the district 
 
   198.  High Point Design, 730 F.3d at 1307-08. 
 199.  Id. at 1309. 
   200.  Id. at 1309-10. 
 201.  Id. at 1310. The district court wrote: 
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court for assessing obviousness from the viewpoint of an “ordinary observer” 
rather than an ordinary designer.202 The district court also erred, according to 
the Federal Circuit, because it failed to “translate the design of the ‘183 Patent 
into a verbal description”203—or perhaps more accurately, for describing the 
design at “too high a level of abstraction” and “failing to focus ‘on the 
distinctive visual appearances of the reference and the claimed design.’”204 
And the Federal Circuit claimed that the district court failed to provide 
sufficient reasoning for its determination that the Penta and/or the Laurel Hill 
served as a primary reference that created “basically the same visual 
impression.”205 The district court was supposed to put the claimed design side-
by-side with the potential primary reference and determine whether the 
reference had basically the same design. It was apparently supposed to do this 
from the perspective of an ordinary designer, though it remains unclear whether 
that standard applied to each step or only to the overall determination of 
obviousness. And to the Federal Circuit, there was some doubt about whether 
the references were close enough.  
This approach is striking in its failure to apply recent Supreme Court 
precedent interpreting the statutory nonobviousness requirement, which is 
common to utility and design patents. In 2007, the Supreme Court determined 
that the Federal Circuit had adopted an overly permissive nonobviousness test 
for utility patents. The rejected test had deemed an invention invalid for 
obviousness only if there was a “teaching, suggestion, or motivation to 
 
The overall visual effect created by the Woolrich prior art is the same overall visual effect 
created by the ‘183 patent. To an ordinary observer, they are the same slippers. The only 
difference between the slippers relates to the sole of the slippers, which is quite minor in the 
context of the overall slipper. Even if, however, this Court were to find that the differences in 
the sole design were of any note, the design of the dots on the ‘183 patent are anticipated by 
the dots on the [Secondary References]. 
  Since both of those design patents were noted on the face of the ‘183 patent, and since 
both relate to slippers, they would have been available to a slipper designer skilled in the 
art—and would have easily suggested the addition of “dots” to the sole of a slipper. 
Combining the dots shown on those two design patents with the prior art in the Woolrich 
slipper would have been obvious to any designer. That combination would have created a 
slipper with a virtually identical visual impression as [the] ‘183 patent. 
Id. (alterations in original). 
 202.  Id. at 1313-15. 
 203.  Id. at 1314. This criticism is in significant tension with Egyptian Goddess, which 
discouraged courts from rendering any verbal claim construction in the design patent 
context. Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 679 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) 
(“Given the recognized difficulties entailed in trying to describe a design in words, the 
preferable course ordinarily will be for a district court not to attempt to ‘construe’ a design 
patent claim by providing a detailed verbal description of the claimed design.”). For a 
persuasive critique of translating images to verbal descriptions, see Rebecca Tushnet, The 
Eye Alone Is the Judge: Images and Design Patents, 19 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 409 (2012). 
 204.  High Point Design, 730 F.3d at 1314 (quoting Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 
678 F.3d 1314, 1331-32 (2012)). 
 205.  Id. 
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combine” pertinent prior art references.206 In rejecting the test, the Court noted 
that “it often may be the case that market demand, rather than scientific 
literature, will drive design trends,” and that “[a] person of ordinary skill is also 
a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.”207  
Despite the purported applicability of the same statutory provision to 
design patents, it seems clear that the Federal Circuit’s standards for 
nonobviousness in design patent law are relatively low, as compared to utility 
patent standards. First, and most obviously, utility patent law has nothing 
analogous to the “primary reference” step the Federal Circuit requires in design 
patent law. Indeed, by requiring a single reference that is so close to the 
claimed design, the Federal Circuit’s approach comes dangerously close to 
collapsing obviousness and novelty altogether. Making matters worse, the 
Federal Circuit’s standard for deeming a prior art reference sufficiently similar 
to serve as a primary reference is quite high. The Federal Circuit’s conclusion 
in High Point that the primary references identified by the district court may 
not have been sufficiently similar attests to the stringency of this standard.  
Likewise, in Apple, Inc. v Samsung Elecs. Co.,208 the Federal Circuit held 
that the 1994 Fidler device was not sufficiently similar to the claimed design to 
count as a primary reference.209 Looking at the two designs side-by-side, the 
Federal Circuit saw substantial differences: the Fidler tablet is not symmetrical; 
the frame of the Fidler tablet differs from the “unframed” Apple design; the 
Fidler tablet contains no thin bezel surrounding edge of the front side; one 
corner of the frame in the Fidler contains multiple perforations; and the sides of 
the Fidler reference are neither smooth nor symmetrical.210  
 
 
Claimed design (left); Fidler design (right)211 
 
 206.  KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2006). 
 207.  Id. at 418, 421. 
 208.  678 F.3d. 1314 (2012). 
 209.  Id. at 1331. 
 210.  Id. at 1330-31. 
 211.  Id. at 1330. 
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Moreover, even assuming that the Fidler tablet qualified as a primary 
reference, the Federal Circuit did not think the other reference (the Hewlett-
Packard Compaq Tablet TC1000) bridged the gap between the Fidler and the 
Apple design:  
First, while the TC1000 has a flat glass front, the screen area of that device is 
surrounded by a gray area that frames the screen. In addition, the perimeter of 
the TC1000 is encircled by a wide rounded-over metallic rim. And the screen 
area contains indicator lights in several places, unlike the minimalist design 
claimed in the D ‘889 patent.212  
 
 
Hewlett-Packard Compaq Tablet TC1000213 
 
Collectively, these differences were enough that the court did not believe 
the two references could be combined. In a statement highly reminiscent of the 
old “teaching, suggestion, and motivation” test, the Federal Circuit noted that 
“[t]he teachings of prior art designs may be combined only when the designs 
are ‘so related that the appearance of certain ornamental features in one 
[design] would suggest the application of those features to the other.’”214 
This practical evisceration of the nonobviousness requirement likely has 
been driven in part by courts’ understandable difficulty in measuring 
“progress” in aesthetic aspects of design, which is what the current 
interpretation of nonobviousness for designs requires. Such a minimal standard 
is more consistent with copyright doctrine, and perhaps it would be justified for 
design patents if they were limited to ornamentation or purely aesthetic aspects 
of design. The Federal Circuit, however, also has declined to enforce any 
 
 212.  Id. at 1331. 
   213.  Id. at 1329. 
 214.  Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting In re Borden, 90 F.3d 1570, 1575 
(1996)). 
001--MCKENNA & STRANDBURG_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/27/2014 9:55 AM 
44 STANFORD TECHNOLOGY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:1 
meaningful limitation of design patent coverage to ornamental or aesthetic 
elements. While copyright protects only those aesthetic features that are 
“conceptually separable” from functional aspects of a useful article,215 design 
patent law disqualifies a claimed design only when the design, as a whole, is 
“dictated by” functional considerations.216 To determine whether a claimed 
design is functional under this standard, a court may consider:  
[1] whether the protected design represents the best design; [2] whether 
alternative designs would adversely affect the utility of the specified article; 
[3] whether there are any concomitant utility patents; [4] whether the 
advertising touts particular features of the design as having specific utility; [5] 
and whether there are any elements in the design or an overall appearance 
clearly not dictated by function.217  
Not surprisingly, courts have only very rarely found a claimed design 
“dictated by function.”218 Design patent doctrine once again has failed to 
rescue the system from the problems that plagued it in 1869—design patents 
undermine utility patent doctrines that protect cumulative technological 
progress by providing “back door” protection for utilitarian features under a 
low patentability standard.  
IV. INTEGRATION OF FORM AND FUNCTION: A SENSIBLE DESIGN PATENT GOAL?  
Design patent’s position at the intersection between patent, copyright, and 
trademark looks more and more like a seat between a rock and a hard place. 
The design patent system is no longer needed as a gap-filler. Unlike the 
copyright law in effect in 1842, present-day copyright covers ornamentation of 
useful three-dimensional objects, separating ornamentation from functional 
 
 215.  See, e.g., Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 
N.Y. 1987); see also supra notes 82-89 and accompanying text. 
 216.  See, e.g., PHG Techs., LLC v. St. John Cos., 469 F.3d 1361, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2006) 
(“The design of a useful article is deemed to be functional when ‘the appearance of the 
claimed design is ‘dictated by’ the use or purpose of the article.’” (quoting L.A. Gear, Inc. v. 
Thom McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 1123 (Fed. Cir. 1993))). 
 217.  High Point Design LLC v. Buyers Direct, Inc., 730 F.3d 1301, 1315-16 (Fed. Cir. 
2013) (alterations in original) (quoting PHG Techs., 469 F.3d at 1366). These factors are 
highly reminiscent of the Federal Circuit’s Morton-Norwich factors, which it uses to asses 
functionality in the trade dress context. See In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 
1332, 1340-41 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (factors are (1) “the existence of an expired utility patent”; 
(2) whether the designer “touts the utilitarian advantages through advertising”; (3) the 
availability of alternative designs; and (4) whether the design results from a “simple or cheap 
method” of manufacture). Notably, those factors were inspired by the competitive necessity 
view of functionality the Supreme Court downplayed in TrafFix. See supra notes 109-110 
and accompanying text. 
 218.  But see Best Lock Corp. v. Ilco Unican Corp., 94 F.3d 1563, 1566-57 (Fed Cir. 
1996) (key blade design claimed in design patent was dictated solely by key blade’s function 
and thus invalid). 
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aspects with its useful article doctrine.219 In Mazer, the Supreme Court missed 
an opportunity to address the relationship between copyright and design 
patents. There, the defendant had argued that copyright protection for the lamp 
bases should be precluded if it would interfere with the design patent system, 
which “require[s] the critical examination given patents to protect the public 
against monopoly.”220 The Court simply failed to engage this issue in any 
meaningful way, merely stating that “[t]he dichotomy of protection for the 
aesthetic is not beauty and utility but art for the copyright and the invention of 
original and ornamental design for design patents.”221 What this statement 
leaves entirely unanswered, of course, is the question that hangs over design 
patent doctrine to this day: What is “invention” in the context of design? If it is 
located neither in copyrightable “art” nor in patentable utility, where is it to be 
found?  
In response to the tension between the nonobviousness doctrine’s 
cumulative conception of progress and the current design patent system’s sole 
focus on the aesthetic and “ornamental” aspects of design, several 
commentators have suggested that the nonobviousness requirement should be 
abolished or significantly weakened.222 However, design patent law’s coverage 
of articles that combine ornamental and functional aspects (as long as design, 
as a whole, is not “dictated by function”) means that a weak design patent 
nonobviousness standard may undermine utility patent law’s balancing 
approach to cumulative technological progress. One solution to this problem 
would be to strengthen design patent law’s functionality requirement, so as to 
more clearly differentiate design patent law’s subject matter from that of utility 
patent law.  But while we think there are good reasons to prevent design patent 
law from protecting useful features, it is not clear what a design patent system 
limited specifically to aesthetic expression would add to the current copyright 
system.223  
We suggest that we can get off the design patent treadmill only if we can 
 
 219.  17 U.S.C. § 101 (2011) (“[T]he design of a useful article, as defined in this 
section, shall be considered a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only if, and only to the 
extent that, such design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be 
identified separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian 
aspects of the article.”). 
 220.  Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 215 (1954). 
 221.  Id. at 217-18. 
 222.  See, e.g., Du Mont, supra note 170, at 535 (“Applying a historical lens, this Article 
establishes yet another basis for policy makers to free design patents from the unworkable 
and inappropriate nonobviousness requirement.”). 
 223.  This is not to say that there is anything inevitable about copyright’s current scope. 
It may well be more sensible, overall, to exclude design of articles of manufacture from 
copyright and use some other system exclusively for design. We take no position on that 
question here. We do, however, have real concerns about whether any such other system 
should be a patent system. 
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reorient the design patent system to a cumulative conception of progress that is 
appropriate to design. To do so, we will need to solve two related problems. 
First, we need some meaningful, even if approximate, metric by which to 
measure aesthetic progress. Without such a metric, we cannot balance the needs 
of current and follow-on inventors of industrial designs. Nor can we assess the 
costs of overlapping trade dress or copyright protection. Second, we need to 
find a way to consider design as an integration of aesthetic and utilitarian 
aspects of product configuration. Prior attempts to prevent use of the design 
patent system as a backdoor form of protection for useful product features, 
from the early attempts to impose separability to the modern ornamentality 
requirement, have foundered.  The attempt to make a sharp distinction between 
the useful features of industrial designs, on the one hand, and their ornamental 
or aesthetic features, on the other, is doomed to failure because overall designs 
(as distinct from surface ornamentation) nearly always are, to a greater or lesser 
extent, both useful and aesthetic.  
Compare, for example, the design of athletic shoes at issue in L.A. Gear, 
Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co.,224 the cup-to-go design in Berry Sterling Corp. v. 
Pescor Plastics, Inc.,225 and Richardson’s design of the “stepclaw” at issue in 
Richardson v. Stanley Works, Inc.,226 depicted below from left to right:227 
 
 
 
Each of these designs has features that are functional in the sense that they 
contribute to the utilitarian performance of the articles. With respect to the shoe 
design, the “delta wing” provides support for the foot and reinforces the 
shoelace eyelets; the cup’s lower portion allows it to fit into most car cup 
holders; and the jaw of the “stepclaw” has to be opposite the hammer head so 
that the tool can be used as a step.228 But at the same time, this particular delta 
wing seems clearly to have aesthetic value, and there are many other ways to 
 
 224.  988 F.2d 1117 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
 225.  122 F.3d 1452 (Fed Cir. 1997). 
 226.  597 F.3d 1288 (Fed Cir. 2010). 
   227.  L.A. Gear, 988 F.2d at 1121 (left); Richardson, 597 F.3d at 1455 fig.3 (center); 
Berry Sterling, 122 F.3d at 1291 fig.1 (right). 
 228.  L.A. Gear, 988 F.2d at 1123; Richardson, 597 F.3d at 1294; Berry Sterling, 122 
F.3d at 1455. 
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support a foot or reinforce the shoelace eyelets. Likewise, cups of a variety of 
sizes and shapes can fit in car cup holders—indeed the designer in that case had 
submitted three designs to Coca-Cola, all of which had the same basic bi-level 
design.229 Coca-Cola rejected one because it thought it was “too short, too 
squat, and too kind of square looking” and because it lacked “sex appeal”—all 
clearly aesthetic aspects of the design.230 And the defendant in Richardson was 
able to produce its own, very similarly functional tool despite clear aesthetic 
differences between that tool and Richardson’s claimed design.231  
 
 
Richardson’s “stepclaw” (left); Defendant’s tool (right)232 
 
These examples demonstrate why the USPTO’s Manual of Patent 
Examining Procedures specifically recognizes that “the utility and 
ornamentality of an article may not be easily separable.”233 Copyright’s 
conceptual separability test has encountered difficulties for the same reason.234 
 
 229.  Berry Sterling, 122 F.3d at 1453. 
 230.  Id. 
 231.  The court in that case filtered out the functional elements and compared the 
remaining aesthetic elements to the defendant’s tool, concluding that, while the Richardson 
tool patent was valid, it was not infringed by the defendant’s design. Richardson, 597 F.3d at 
1296. 
   232.  Id. at 1291-92. 
 233.  U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING 
PROCEDURE § 1502.01 (8th ed. Rev. 9, Aug. 2012), available at http://www.uspto.gov 
/web/offices/pac/mpep/s1502.html#d0e150263. 
 234.  We are not, of course, the first to observe this. Indeed, several decades ago a 
number of prominent copyright commentators lamented the difficulties associated with 
trying to distinguish the creative or aesthetic features of industrial design and their useful 
counterparts. See NIMMER, supra note 90, § 2.09[B][3]; Brown, supra note 107, at 
1395-1404; Robert C. Denicola, Applied Art and Industrial Design: A Suggested Approach 
to Copyright in Useful Articles, 67 MINN. L. REV. 707 (1983); Jerome H. Reichman, Design 
Protection After the Copyright Act of 1976: A Comparative View of the Emerging Interim 
Models, 31 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 267 (1984). Notably, those of that group who were 
concerned that the separability analysis not be too rigorous were quite clear their hope for 
copyright protection was animated by their view of the inadequacy of design patent 
protection. See NIMMER, supra note 90, § 2.08[B][3] (“Unless and until special design 
legislation is adopted, if the choice is full copyright protection or none at all, it may be that 
the former alternative is preferable.”); Reichman, supra, at 350 (calling the failure to achieve 
comprehensive short-term protection for the design of useful articles a “mutilation” that left 
copyright with the separability test and no effective protection for the designs excluded from 
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The inherent duality of industrial design is also behind the Supreme Court’s 
skepticism about trade dress for product configuration. Design patent law’s 
“dictated by function” test appears to recognize that product designs often link 
aesthetic and utilitarian aspects inextricably, but its solution to that difficulty is 
to raise the functionality threshold so high that it permits design patents for 
product designs that are primarily utilitarian in nature.  
One significant thread of modern design theory suggests a possible solution 
to this dilemma, though one that would require a reorientation of design patent 
doctrine. Specifically, design patent law might be focused precisely on those 
design elements that integrate the useful and the aesthetic—those that currently 
bedevil intellectual property law precisely because they defy the binary 
distinctions the law attempts to draw in each area. To be clear, we are not sure 
that it is, in fact, appropriate to conceive of progress in integration of form and 
function in cumulative terms, as we have argued is necessary for a patent 
system. Nor are we sure that patent-like protection—or protection of any kind, 
for that matter—is necessary to incentivize investment in better integrated 
design.235 But we do argue that integration is the right focus for a design patent 
system if we are to have one. First, conceiving of design patent protection in 
terms of integration would better align design patent law with the goals of 
many designers. Second, if it is possible to assess incremental improvement in 
integration, then it might be possible to evaluate the obviousness of a design in 
some coherent way. Third, this conception gives some basis for navigating 
design patent law’s boundaries with other forms of IP protection. Fourth, and 
finally, identifying a specific purpose for the design patent system would allow 
us to ask fundamental questions about whether such protection is needed to 
induce investment, and if so what the scope and duration of the protection 
ought to be. As we suggested at the outset, it is impossible to ask whether we 
need a design patent system until we know what such a system would be 
needed for.  
The goal of incentivizing designs that effectively integrate form and 
function appears to be consistent with the way that at least some designers 
themselves conceptualize their role.236 Thus, for example, the website of the 
 
copyright as a result). Even Brown, who was more skeptical of design protection and more 
inclined to support a competitive baseline of free copying, regarded design patent protection 
as essentially meaningless. Times obviously have changed. Brown, supra note 107, at 1356 
(calling design patents “a Cinderella who never goes to the ball”). 
 235.  For one thing, designs of articles of manufacture are inextricably part of products 
that are demanded, at least in part, for their utilitarian function. Producers of those articles 
have strong incentive to make their products attractive to consumers so that consumers will 
demand their products rather than those of their competitors. It is hard to imagine that 
incentive disappearing if others copy the design—indeed copying may in many cases 
increase the incentive to produce new designs, as it seems to do in fashion. See generally 
KAL RAUSTIALA & CHRISTOPHER SPRIGMAN, THE KNOCKOFF ECONOMY (2012). 
 236.  See Mueller & Brean, supra note 192, at 441-42. 
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Industrial Designers Society of America describes industrial design as “creating 
and developing concepts and specifications that optimize the function, value 
and appearance of products and systems for the mutual benefit of both user and 
manufacturer,” while “[t]he industrial designer’s unique contribution places 
emphasis on those aspects of the product or system that relate most directly to 
human characteristics, needs and interests,” applying “specialized 
understanding of visual tactile, safety and convenience criteria.”237 While 
designers are not driven by the kind of quantifiable metrics of improvement 
that often motivate technological innovation, they do engage in research to 
determine user preferences and needs, and to understand user experience with 
existing products. They often look to earlier designs of similar products for 
inspiration, though the most inspired designs often come from incorporating 
ideas from far afield.238  Moreover, like the inventors of more traditional 
technologies, they are constrained in their designs by the need to accomplish 
utilitarian ends. Though there may be many possible ways to combine 
aesthetics with function, there are not an infinite number.  
It seems possible, then, though not certain, that industrial design is an arena 
in which the cumulative progress notion underlying patent doctrine makes 
sense. If so, it may be possible to build a coherent and socially beneficial 
design patent system based on a requirement that a patentable design integrate 
the aesthetic and utilitarian elements of an article of manufacture in a way that 
would not have been obvious to a designer of ordinary skill in the art. Though 
there may not be a “definitive test or metric” for evaluating the nonobviousness 
of a design,239 definitive tests for nonobviousness are hard to come by even in 
the utility patent arena. In any event, nonobviousness would make much more 
sense in a design patent system based on integration of form and function than 
it does in today’s muddled doctrine. The nonobviousness doctrine in a design 
patent system reformed along these lines would also be likely to have more 
bite, since we suspect that a fair amount of industrial design is sufficiently 
incentivized by the first mover advantages of a competitive market. The 
obviousness analysis almost certainly would look different from the Federal 
Circuit’s permissive “primary reference” approach, which seems very far 
removed from the way in which industrial designers go about devising designs 
 
 237.  Fact Sheet, INDUS. DESIGNERS SOC’Y OF AM., at 3 (Mar. 15, 2012, 6:53 PM), 
http://www.idsa.org/sites/default/files/IDSAFactSheet2013.pdf. 
 238.  See Mueller & Brean, supra note 192, at 440. Mueller and Brean take this reliance 
on far-flung sources as an argument against applying the analogous arts concept from 
nonobviousness analysis in the utility patent realm. We see much less of a distinction. The 
analogous arts doctrine rewards those who look to non-analogous sources of prior art in the 
utility patent arena and it would seem no less appropriate to do so in the design patent arena. 
The trick, of course, is to define “analogous arts” in a way that reflects the common practice 
of inventors in the respective arenas. 
 239.  Id. at 442. 
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that will integrate functionality and aesthetics.  
A goal of promoting integration of form and function would structure the 
analysis of functionality and other boundary doctrines. Design patents based on 
nonobvious advances in integrating form and function could not be used to 
circumvent the strictures of utility patent law, for example. Certainly design 
patents would no longer be awarded to designs that merely combined utilitarian 
features with ornamentation in obvious ways, even if that ornamentation was 
highly creative and was not “dictated by function.” A design patent law focused 
on the way in which designers build upon prior designs to produce better 
experiences for product users also would not cover aesthetic aspects of useful 
articles that were entirely unintegrated with utilitarian aspects. Like the very 
first design patent case involving the rhombus-shaped ribbon reel, the doctrine 
would reject patents on designs in which the relationship between aesthetic and 
utilitarian aspects was “simply . . . arbitrary.”240 Features such as surface 
ornamentation, for which the cumulative progress model of patent law is 
inapposite, would be left to the copyright system, with all of its warts.  
Indeed, conceiving of design patents in terms of integration of form and 
function not only would give design patent law a clear domain in which it is not 
purely redundant of some other form of IP, but it might even help bring some 
coherence to copyright’s separability and trademark’s functionality doctrines. If 
design patents are intended to promote cumulative progress in integration of 
form and function, the right to copy unpatented industrial designs would be 
reinvigorated. Copyright and trade dress protections would be subjugated to the 
new design patent doctrine’s balance between the needs of current and future 
designers, just as they currently are subjected to utility patent’s balance. 
Copyright’s separability doctrine would have to be interpreted quite strictly to 
avoid copyright intrusion into design patent terrain. Thus, copyright might be 
available only for industrial designs with completely separable aesthetic 
features—perhaps surface ornamentation, visual patterns on fabric, etc. The 
approach to design patents suggested in this Article, if feasible, would reserve 
such patents for features that, like those claimed in utility patents, are likely to 
meet the Inwood standard for trademark functionality and unlikely to be merely 
“incidental” or “arbitrary.” Thus trade dress protection would be available only 
when the product configuration at issue not only indicated source, but also 
could not be the proper subject matter of either a utility or design patent. The 
“competitive necessity” approach to aesthetic functionality would apply at most 
to conceptually separable aesthetic aspects of useful articles. An approach to 
design patents based upon the integration of form and function would also 
make sense of and clarify Wal-Mart’s distinction between product packaging 
and product design, since improvements resulting from the interplay between 
form and function are more likely to arise in the context of product design than 
 
 240.  See Wooster v. Crane, 30 F. Cas. 612, 612 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1865) (No. 18,036). 
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in the context of product packaging.241  
Of course, we may not ultimately be able to base a sensible design patent 
system on the goal of integrating form and function. It may turn out to be 
impossible to define integration in a way that courts and the PTO can 
operationalize. Or the task of determining whether a particular design integrates 
form and function in a way that would be nonobvious to a designer of ordinary 
skill in the art may prove to be too difficult or ill-defined. But, in our view, no 
other coherent justification has been offered for a design patent system. If it 
turns out that there is no workable measure of progress in integration, then our 
analysis leads us to conclude that there can be no sensible design patent system.  
 
  
 
 241.  Indeed, it is easy to think of changes in product packaging which have been 
detrimental to consumer usability, as anyone who has attempted to open a shrink-wrapped 
CD knows all too well. 
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